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CONSUMER-DIRECTED HEALTH CARE AND THE
CHRONICALLY ILL
John V. Jacobi*
Insurance plans with consumer-controlled spending accounts are advocated as
tools for reducing health costs and empowering consumers. This Article describes
their recent development and argues that they are likely to fail. Instead offocusing
on the small number of consumers with chronic illnesses who account for the bulk
of health spending they focus on the majority of relatively well consumers. This
Article proposes market-based and regulatory changes focused on high-cost pa-
tients. To best serve cost and quality goals, health finance responsibility should be
divided between consumers and their employers for predictable and routine costs,
and government for chronic and catastrophic costs.
Many Americans have given up traditional pension benefits in
which they and their fellows contribute to a general pool and re-
ceive fixed benefits tied to a common formula. In exchange, they
have moved to individual retirement plans, in which they have re-
sponsibility and control over funds dedicated to their use. For a
decade or more, a similar "ownership society" approach has been
urged for health benefits as well-a call that was largely ignored.'
More recently, health costs are soaring while insurance coverage is
shrinking, as managed care's magic has failed the health finance
system. As a result, the marketplace has begun to adopt consumer-
directed plans, prominently including those combining self-
directed individual spending accounts with high-deductible health
2insurance coverage.
The Medicare Modernization Act of 2003 placed consumer-
directed plans squarely within the tax-privileged world of American
* Professor of Law and Associate Director of the Health Law & Policy Program,
Seton Hall Law School. Thanks to the participants in the American Society of Law, Medicine
and Ethics Annual Health Law Teachers Conference for their helpful comments, and to
Andrea Hattan and Kimberly Kempton for their research assistance.
1. SeeJOHN C. GOODMAN & GERALD L. MUSGRAVE, PATIENT POWER: SOLVING AMER-
ICA'S HEALTH CARE CRISIS (1992); Emmett B. Keeler et al., Can Medical Savings Accounts for
the Nonelderly Reduce Health Care Costs?, 275 JAMA 1666 (1996); Mark V. Pauly & John C.
Goodman, Tax Credits for Health Insurance and Medical Savings Accounts, HEALTH AFt., Spring
1995, at 125, 126.
2. See Anthony T. Lo Sasso et al., Tales from the New Frontier: Pioneers' Experiences with
Consumer-Driven Health Care, 39 HEALTH SERV. RES. 1071 (2004); Jon R. Gabel et al., Con-
sumer-Driven Health Plans: Are They More Than Talk Now?, HEALTH AFF. WEB EXCLUSIVE W395
(Nov. 20, 2002), at http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w2.3 9 5vl (on file
with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
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health coverage.3 The Florida Legislature has recently mandated
that health insurers offering coverage to small employers must of-
fer "a high deductible plan that meets the requirements of a health
savings account plan as defined by federal law or a health reim-
bursement arrangement as authorized by the Internal Revenue
Service."4 And consumer driven care has recently received boosts
from Council of Economic Advisors to the President,5 the Internal
• 6
Revenue Service, academic commentators,7 and the popular
press.
Will consumer-driven health plans moderate costs and increase
access where the managed care revolution and other fixes failed?
Researchers have urged that government and employers resist the
temptation to jump into consumer-driven health care with both
feet until more is known about the effects of such a move.9 Gov-
3. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 (Medi-
care Modernization Act), Pub. L. No. 108-173, Tide XII, 117 Star. 2066, 2469-80 (2003); see
H.R. CONF. REP. No. 108-391, at 836-50 (2003), reprinted in 2004 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1808, 2188-
200 (describing the creation of a tax-favored HSA-based coverage option); Barry L. Salkin,
Health Savings Account: A New Defined Contribution Health Plan, 72 PRAc. TAX STRATEGIES 196
(2004) (describing the tax consequences of Tire XII of the Medicare Modernization Act).
4. The Affordable Health Care For Floridians Act, 2004 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 2004-297,
§ 24 (West).
5. 2004 COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISORS ANNUAL REPORT 199-200 (supporting
Health Savings Account-based plans as means to avoid moral hazard in health insurance).
6. In 2002, prior to the passage of the Medicare Modernization Act, the IRS boosted
the prospects of CDHPs by ruling that contributions to Health Reimbursement Arrange-
ments (a precursor to HSAs) could "roll over" from year to year, a step seen as necessary to
make CDHPs attractive to consumers. Rev. Rul. 200241, 2002-2 C.B. 75; I.R.S. Notice 2002-
45, 2002-2 C.B. 93; see also Kurt Ritterpusch, IRS's Health Reimbursement Arrangements Clear
Path for "Consumer-Driven"Health Care, 11 BNA HEALTH L. REP. 979 (2002).
7. See, e.g., CONSUMER-DRIVEN HEALTH CARE: IMPLICATIONS FOR PROVIDERS, PAYERS,
AND POLICYMAKERS (Regina Herzlinger ed., 2004) [hereinafter CONSUMER-DRIVEN HEALTH
CARE] (gathering commentary in favor of consumer-driven health care).
8. See Susan Lee, A Tax-Code Cure for Ailing Health Care, WALL ST. J., Aug. 9, 2004, at
A13 (identifying traditional third-party health insurance as the "mother of problems" of the
American health system and advocating extensive consumer cost responsibility).
9. See Gabel et al., supra note 2, at W406:
If there is one message that resonates loudly from our interviews, it is this: "Political
partisans, hold your fire! More research and experience are needed!" Independent
research is desperately required to address the many issues we have identified. Re-
searchers need to measure the extent of risk selection through studies that examine
employees' health status before they enroll in consumer-driven plans and their com-
petitors. Researchers should analyze the redistribution of out-of-pocket costs and
services in HRA plans among the sick and healthy... After controlling for risk selec-
tion, researchers need to analyze both the consumer-driven plans' ability to control
claims expenses and plans' impact on health status and employee satisfaction.
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ernments" and employers," however, have made the jump, and the
movement is likely to accelerate as there are few other viable sug-
gestions emerging in the health reform debate.
This Article will describe the history of serial adoption of incre-
mental and ineffective health care reform measures including,
most recently, managed care) It will describe the advancement of
consumer-driven care as a natural if controversial response to the
failure of managed care. It will also argue that the market has al-
ready begun to adopt simple forms of consumer-directed care,
ignoring the advice of the movement's more sophisticated advo-
cates in favor of short-term cost-savings. In this regard, consumer-
driven care is repeating the mistakes of the managed care "revolu-
tion."
The adoption of consumer-driven health plans is likely to fail for
two reasons. It will endanger the health and well-being of the
chronically ill (those most reliant on health coverage), and it will
fail (as did the managed care "revolution") to contain costs. These
failures will result in large part from the failure of emerging con-
sumer-driven plans to account for the fact that health spending is
severely and necessarily concentrated on care for the very few.
Forty percent of health spending is attributable to the sickest 2
percent of the population, and 70 percent to the sickest 10 per-
cent. 13 And health care services used by the chronically ill account
for about 75 percent of all direct health care costs.' 4 As the lion's
10. See Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003,
Pub. L. No. 108-173, Title XII, 117 Stat. 2066, 2469-80 (2003); The Affordable Health Care
For Floridians Act, 2004 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 2004-297, § 24 (West).
11. See Ron Lieber, New Way to Curb Medical Costs: Make Employees Feel the Sting, WALL ST.
J., June 23, 2004, at Al (reporting on Whole Foods Market Inc.'s adoption of a consumer-
driven plan for its employees comprised of employee spending accounts and high-
deductible insurance); Lo Sasso et al., supra note 2, at 1073-87 (describing the adoption of
consumer-driven plans by several employers).
12. See Drew E. Altman & Larry Levitt, The Sad History of Health Care Cost Containment As
Told In One Chart, HEALTH AFF. WEB EXCLUSIVE W83 (Jan. 23, 2002), at
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w2.83vl (on file with the University of
Michigan Journal of Law Reform) (documenting the limited impact of an array of cost-
containment efforts).
13. See Marc L. Berk & Alan C. Monheit, The Concentration of Health Care Expenditures,
Revisited, HEALTH AFF., Mar.-Apr. 2001, at 9, 12 (updating national health care expenditure
studies from 1988 and 1992 based on the results of the 1996 Medical Expenditure Panel
Survey (MEPS), a two-year study of 23,000 persons in 10,000 households administered by the
Agency for Health Care Research and Quality that gathered information from various
sources nationwide, including consumers, health care institutions, and insurance compa-
nies). Id. at 17 nn.1, 6.
14. Catherine Hoffman et al., Persons With Chronic Conditions: Their Prevalence and Costs,
276JAMA 1473, 1476 (1996); see also infra Part III(B) (discussing the costs of care for people
with chronic conditions).
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share of health expenditures go to those with very predictable, very
expensive health care needs, it is at least misleading to suggest, as
advocates of consumer-driven care do, that careful shopping can
restrain costs for health care as careful shopping can contain costs
for clothing 5 or breakfast. 6 The adoption of essentially unregu-
lated, simplistic forms of consumer-driven plans will harm
individuals with chronic illness, who simply cannot choose to
forego necessary, frequent services, and who face impoverishment
and/or denial of care under these plans. 7 It will also harm spon-
sors and society as a whole, who will discover that the mismatch
between consumer-driven plans and the reality of health spending
demographics will lead to increased costs. We appear poised to
hand over our health finance fate to entrepreneurs who highjack
complex and controversial insurance theory, dumb it down, and
frustrate our hopes for meaningful reform-much as we did with
managed care.
Consumer-driven care seems likely to assume a large portion of
the health finance system, and it is likely to appear in the guise of
simple plans doomed to failure. As H.L. Mencken said, "There is
always an easy solution to every human problem-neat, plausible,
and wrong." 9 How can this failure be averted? The final section of
this Article suggests market-based and regulatory corrections. As
was the case with managed care,0 plan sponsors may hear the cost-
saving message of consumer power (driven home, perhaps, by sim-
plistic analogies to other consumer settings), but miss the subtler
15. See 2004 COUNCIL ECON. ADV. ANN. REP. 195 (likening the moral hazard of third-
party health insurance to hypothetical problems of third-party insurance for clothing pur-
chases).
16. See CONSUMER-DRIVEN HEALTH CARE, supra note 7, at 61-73 (using "breakfast in-
surance" as a thought experiment to examine moral hazard in health insurance). I do not
mean to suggest that Professor Herzlinger is guilty of oversimplification, or that she is not
aware of the significant differences between health care and other services. Indeed, the
volume she edited contains much that could assist serious regulators of consumer-driven
health care. However, the "breakfast insurance" thought experiment obscures as much as it
clarifies the serious concerns arising from chronic health care.
17. See infa Part III (C) (1).
18. See infra Part III (C) (2).
19. H. L. MENCKEN, The Divine Afflatus, in A MENCKEN CHRESTOMATHY 442, 443
(1949); see also Consumer-Directed Doctoring: The Doctor Is In, Even If Insurance Is Out: Statement
Before The Joint Economic Committee, 108th Cong. 93 (2004) (statement of Robert A. Berenson)
(quoting Mencken).
20. See Clark C. Havighurst, How the Health Care Revolution Fell Short, LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Autumn 2002, at 74-77 (noting that managed care managers failed to employ the
tools developed by theoreticians, leading to the social failure of managed care); Alain C.
Enthoven & Sara J. Singer, Unrealistic Expectations Born of Defective Institutions, 24 J. HEALTH
POL., POL'Y & L. 931, 935-36 (explaining how managed care failed to incorporate properly
sensible management principles that could have contained costs).
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message about the need to thoughtfully tailor consumer-driven
health care to the true needs of society, and principally to the
needs of the chronically ill. It ends by observing that the prescrip-
tions of the most original advocates for consumer-driven care
(those whose complex programs are in danger of being ignored as
the marketplace begins to adopt consumer-driven plans) resonate
with the recommendations of commentators from other perspec-
tives: embrace the concentration of costs in the chronically ill;
ignore the easy "solutions" of the non-problem of health care
spending by the well; direct research, resources, and management
to the care of the few for whom health insurance is necessary and
for whom care is necessarily expensive.
I. THE PATH TO CONSUMER-DRIVEN HEALTH CARE
America continues to search for a way out of its health finance
problems. We continue to spend profligately,21 devoting about half
more on health care than other industrialized nations. 2 In return
for spending about $1.7 trillion in 2004,23 we received poor cover-
age-almost 44 million uninsured for the entire year, and over 81
million uninsured for at least six months.24 In addition to poor
coverage, we are learning that the health care provided is often of
poorer quality than we expect from the supposed greatest health
care system in the world.2'
21. SeeJon Gabel et al., Health Benefits in 2003: Premiums Reach Thirteen-Year High As Em-
ployers Adopt New Forms of Cost Sharing, HEALTH Ant., Sept.-Oct. 2003, at 117 (explaining that
the cost of health coverage rose 13.9% from spring 2002 to spring 2003, "the largest increase
in the cost ofjob-based insurance since 1990"); Stephen Heffler et al., Health Spending Projec-
tions Through 2013, HEALTH AFF. WEB EXCLUSIVE W4-79 to W4-80 (Feb. 11, 2004), at
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w4.79vl (on file with the University of
Michigan Journal of Law Reform) (projecting that though the rate of overall health inflation
is moderating, increases will continue to exceed the rate of background inflation and na-
tional health expenditures will consume 18.4% of GDP by 2013).
22. See Manfred Huber & Eva Orosz, Health Expenditure Trends in OECD Countries, 1990-
2001, 25 HEALTH CARE FIN. REV. 1, 4 (2003) (comparing health expenditures by nation as a
percentage of gross domestic product).
23. SeeHeffler et al., supra note 21, at W4-80.
24. See FAMILIES USA, ONE IN THREE: NON-ELDERLY AMERICANS WITHOUT HEALTH IN-
SURANCE, 2002-2003 1, 3 (2004), available at http://www.familiesusa.org/site/DocServer/
83million-uninsured-report.pdf?docD=3641 (on file with the University of Michigan Jour-
nal of Law Reform); see also David Leonhardt, More Americans Were Uninsured and Poor in
2003, Census Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2004, at Al (reporting 2003 Census Bureau calcula-
tions).
25. See Eve A. Kerr et al., Profiling The Quality of Care In Twelve Communities: Results From
The CQI Study, HEALTH Ai., May-June 2004, at 247, 251-52 ("In the community with the
SPRING 2005]
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Our health finance system is a private-market employment-based
system with an overlay of public insurance for some of the poor,
elderly and disabled. In the face of criticism of this system, Ameri-
cans reject calls for broadly systemic reforms, tending instead to
patch the system with a series of minor fixes and subtle redirec-
tions of policy.2 6 A series of such shifts over the last several decades
has failed to restrain health costs, and have similarly failed to make
a dent in the rate of uninsurance. 7 The incumbent fix to American
health finance is managed care, by which private firms attempt to
reduce costs and thereby expand access by independently review-
ing cost decisions made by physicians and patients. " This
29
mechanism also has failed to achieve savings over the long term,
and we are casting about for the next means by which to control
health costs and increase insurance coverage.
A. From Central Planning to Markets-A Shift of Emphasis
The consumer-driven health care movement is a reaction to the
dominance of managed care in modem American health insur-
ance. But managed care was itself a reaction to previous cost-
highest overall quality score, less than 60 percent of effective care was delivered on aver-
age."); Elizabeth McGlynn et al., The Quality of Health Care Delivered to Adults in the United
States, 348 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2635, 2641 (2003) (documenting a survey that found the stud-
ied population received only 54.9% of recommended care, with the receipt of
recommended care similarly poor for preventive, acute, and chronic care); COMMIrrEE ON
QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE IN AMERICA, INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, To ERR IS HUMAN, BUILD-
ING A SAFER HEATH SYSTEM (Linda T. Kohn et al. eds., 2000) (reporting studies that
estimate 44,000 to 98,000 Americans die each year as a result of medical errors in hospitals,
7000 from medication errors alone); see also THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, FIRST REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COMMONWEALTH FUND'S INTERNATIONAL WORKING GROUP ON
QUALITY INDICATORS: A REPORT TO HEALTH MINISTERS OF AUSTRALIA, CANADA, NEW ZEA-
LAND, THE UNITED KINGDOM, AND THE UNITED STATES (2004), available at
http://www.cmwf.org/usr_doc/ministerscomplete2004report_752.pdf (on file with the
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) (reporting research that suggests America's
higher spending for health care does not translate into better care than that received in
nations paying far less for care).
26. Judith Feder, Crowd-out and the Politics of Health Reform, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 461,
463 (2004).
27. Altman & Levitt, supra note 12, at W83.
28. PETER D. JACOBSON, STRANGERS IN THE NIGHT: LAW AND MEDICINE IN THE MAN-
AGED CARE ERA 8 (2002).
29. See Peter D. Jacobson, Who Killed Managed Care? A Policy Whodunit, 47 ST. Louis U.
L.J. 365, 368-69 (2003) (examining the failure of managed care); James C. Robinson, The
End of Managed Care, 285JAMA 2622, 2623 (2001) (ascribing the failure of managed care, in
part, to its failure to explain how to substitute its judgment for those of physicians and pa-
tients).
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containment regimes, all of which attempted but failed to create a
structural solution to health coverage inflation. ° Private insurance
coverage and federal funding through the Hill-Burton program
and the creation of Medicare and Medicaid had fueled health ex-
penditures. In fact, health care spending has been outstripping
background inflation for decades, notwithstanding an impressive
armamentarium of cost-containment tools. 32 Theories of health
finance sought to reduce inflation and increase coverage by bal-
33
ancing governmental and private market power in various ways.
As health inflation rose in the 1970s, for example, Congress im-
plemented curbs on Medicare's payment for capital expenditures
and instituted peer review of hospital admissions decisions.s But
the 1970s saw reliance on regulatory solutions featuring supply-side
restraints, by which the construction and availability of health care
resources were constrained in order to reduce consumption. These
controls were guided, in theory, by the community-driven health
planning process funded and fostered by the National Health Re-
sources Planning and Development Act of 1974.'5 The principal
supply-side cost-containment tool of this health planning process
was the certificate of need.36
Certificate of need programs attempt to reduce health care costs
somewhat indirectly by requiring prior approval for health facilities
construction and the initiation of some high-cost health services.
30. See Altman & Levitt, supra note 12, at W84 (describing graphically the relatively
uniform failure of cost-containment efforts over the last four decades).
31. See Randall R. Bovbjerg et al., U.S. Health Care Coverage and Costs: Historical Develop-
ment for the 1990s, 21 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 141, 148-52 (1993); Patrick John McGinley,
Comment, Beyond Health Care Reform: Reconsidering Certificate of Need Laws in a "Managed Com-
petition" System, 23 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 141, 145-46 (1995).
32. See Bovbjerg et al., supra note 31, at 148-52; McGinley, supra note 31, at 145-46.
33. See M. Gregg Bloche, The Invention of Health Law, 91 CAL. L. REv. 247, 253-55
(2003) (discussing the tension between descriptions of health finance as market-driven or
socially governed); Rand Rosenblatt, The Four Ages of Health Law, 14 HEALTH MATRIX 155,
155-61 (2004) (describing the history of American health law).
34. Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, §§ 207, 211(c) (2), 221,
223(b); see also Eleanor D. Kinney, Behind the Veil Where the Action Is: Private Policy Making and
American Health Care, 51 ADMIN. L. REv. 145, 163 (1999).
35. 42 U.S.C. § 300k (repealed 1986); see also BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW
30-31 (2d ed. 2000); McGinley, supra note 31, at 147-48. See generallyJames E Blumstein &
Frank A. Sloan, Health Planning and Regulation Through Certficate of Need: An Overview, 1978
UTAH L. REv. 3 (1978); Peter P. Budetti, Public Policy Issues Surrounding Certificate of Need,
1978 UTAH L. REV. 39 (1978).
36. Certificate of need programs have other purposes than cost containment, includ-
ing improving access to care for low-income consumers. See Christopher Conover & Frank A.
Sloan, Does Removing Certificate of Need Regulations Lead to a Surge in Health Care Spending?, 23 J.
HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 455, 477-78 (1998).
37. See FURROW ET AL., supra note 35, at 32-35.
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Cost savings were to be achieved by reducing the level of invest-
ment in new facilities and services. Such constraints responded to
the "Roemer effect," which hypothesized that utilization increases
directly with the capacity of health facilities-"A bed built is a bed
filled is a bed billed" M-and therefore focused cost-containment
efforts on restricting physical capacity for services.' Certificate of
need had little or no moderating effect on hospital costs, and
probably had little or no effect on other areas of health spending. °
Whether this failure was attributable to a fault in the theory or to
capture of the "community" planning process by the regulated in-
dustry," Congress pulled the plug on health planning in 1986 with
the repeal of the National Health Resources Planning and Devel-
opment Act.
42
By the 1980s, confidence in government cost control through
facilities management had begun to give way to confidence in
markets, leading to the managed care "revolution."4 3 In general,
both the theory and practice of the managed care revolution are of
interest in evaluating consumer-driven health care and in particu-
lar, the divergence between managed care's theory and execution
38. Id. at 29 (citing Milton Roemer, Bed Supply and Hospital Utilization: A Natural Ex-
periment, 35 HosP. 37 (1961)).
39. See FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION & DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, IMPROVING HEALTH
CARE: A DOSE OF COMPETITION: A REPORT BY THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION AND THE
DEPARTMENT OFJUSTICE (July 2004), available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/index.htm (on
file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) [hereinafter IMPROVING
HEALTH CARE: A DOSE OF COMPETITION] (reporting commentators' view that demand in
health care is generated partially by providers); FURROW ET AL., supra note 35, at 29;
McGinley, supra note 31, at 155-56.
40. See IMPROVING HEALTH CARE: A DOSE OF COMPETITION, supra note 39 (gathering
testimony and studies that find no cost-controlling effect); FuRRow ET AL., Supra note 35, at
30; Conover & Sloan, supra note 36, at 463. But seeJames B. Simpson, Full Circle: The Return of
Certicate of Need Regulation of Health Facilities to State Contro4 19 IND. L. REV. 1025, 1079-82
(1986) (noting increases in new construction following repeal of CON laws in some states,
and arguing that CON laws held down such costly construction).
41. See Clark Havighurst, The Changing Locus of Decision Making in the Health Car Sector,
IIJ. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 697, 709-10 (1986).
42. National Health Resources Planning and Development Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C.
§ 300k, repealed by Pub. L. No. 99-660, §§ 701-816 (1986). See FURROW ET AL., supra note 35,
at 31; CLARK C. HAVIGHURST ET AL., HEATH CARE LAW AND POLICY 714-20 (1998). Many
states continue to require certificates of need, however, with varying degrees of community
involvement. See FURROW ET AL., supra note 35, at 32-33 (listing state statutes); McGinley,
supra note 31, at 144, 160.
43. See Pub. L. No. 96-79 (1979) (amending the National Health Resources Planning
and Development Act to require health planners to recognize competition as a method of
cost control and give special status to HMOs in health planning decisions); FURROW ET AL.,
supra note 35, at 31.
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may suggest a cautionary message for consumer-driven health
care's future.'
B. Proxy Markets: The Rise and Fall of Managed Care
Managed care proposed recentering the focus of health care de-
cision-making in order to contain costs and improve the quality of
medical services. Previously, supply-side methods of cost contain-
ment such as certificate of need laws assumed excess medical
spending and that the cause of excess spending is doctors operat-
ing without economic restraint,45 and therefore provided restraints
by removing the occasion of sin-facilities in which to spend.46
Managed care theorists agree that doctors control spending deci-
sions, but instead of depriving them of the opportunity to
overspend, the theorists would inject market incentives into the
relationship of insurer, physician, and patient. One branch of
managed care theory would create market pressure for cost control
and quality improvement by restructuring medical practice into
integrated, coordinated group practices, compensated prospec-
tively for all appropriate care, thus encouraging physicians to
practice without the "piece-work" incentive of overutilization.47 An-
other, more overtly demand-side strain would invest consumers
with the power to choose from among a wide variety of plans more
or less managed, more or less rich, presumably on the basis of the
consumers' economic preferences for more or less coverage by
higher or lower quality plans.4' These two strains are arguably
44. See Robert M. Crane & Laura A. Tollen, Out Of The Frying Pan And Into The Fire,
HEALTH AFF. WEB EXCLUSIVE W155, W157 (Mar. 20, 2002), at
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaffw2.155vl (on file with the University of
Michigan Journal of Law Reform) (warning that placing large cost-sharing burdens on some
employees-particularly those with chronic illness-could lead those employees to be "for
all intents and purposes, uninsured for large portions of their care").
45. See Bloche, supra note 33, at 257-61 (2003) (noting that the meaning of the phrase
.excess spending in health care" is often undefined or at least obscure). For present pur-
poses, "excess spending" means spending on care that is either not efficacious or offers so
little benefit as to be regarded as inappropriate.
46. E. HAAVI MORREIM, HOLDING HEALTH CARE ACCOUNTABLE: LAW AND THE NEW
MEDICAL MARKETPLACE 18-19 (2001) (observing that a system of health finance in which
the only criterion for coverage of a procedure is whether physicians regard it as medically
"necessary" results in an "artesian well of money" for health services).
47. Gail B. Agrawal & Howard R. Veit, Is the Health Care Revolution Finished?, 65 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 11, 20-28 (2002).
48. See CLARK C. HAVIGHURST, HEALTH CARE CHOICES: PRIVATE CONTRACTS AS IN-
STRUMENTS OF HEALTH REFORM 177-80 (1995) (advocating private contract theory as a basis
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bridged by various forms of "managed competition" which argue
for robust competition among plans for market share in a market
in which consumers have substantial authority, but in which gov-
ernmental regulation frames the nature of choices consumers can
make. 9 If one can generalize, advocates of reform through man-
aged care would combat moral hazard by realigning physicians'
financial incentives, and would protect consumers from a perver-
sion of those incentives through some combination of structural
regulation of plans and informed consumer choice among plans.
The goals of these plan-based competition models are both con-
50taining cost and improving the quality of care. Managed care
became the dominant force in health finance, however, not
through systemic reforms institutionalizing uniform structures or
regulatory checks, but rather by default, as systemic reform efforts
petered out.51 In other words, market-based reform in health fi-
nance emerged as a result of market forces, without the structural
constraints envisioned by some theorists. As commercial insurance
companies' adoption of managed care methods made attractively
priced managed care plans widely available, employers, govern-
ment, and other sponsors responded.5 2 For a time, market-based,
managed care-oriented health finance seemed to work. Health
care cost trends flattened in the mid-1990s.13 But health inflation
for health reform as opposed to public regulation). See also Agrawal & Veit, supra note 47, at
27-28 (describing contractarian theory of managed-care based health reform); Wendy K.
Mariner, Can Consumer-Choice Plans Satisfy Patients? Problems with Theory and Practice in Health
Insurance Contracts, 69 BROOK. L. REv. 485, 488-90 (2004) (discussing contract mechanisms
as a regulatory tool in managed care).
49. See Agrawal & Veit, supra note 47, at 25-27; Alain C. Enthoven, The History and Prin-
ciples of Managed Competition, HEALTH AW., Supp. 1993, at 24 (reviewing the structure of
managed competition in connection with President Clinton's proposal for health reform);
Shoshanna Sofaer, Informing and Protecting Consumers Under Managed Competition, HEALTH
AFs., Supp. 1993, at 76 (discussing required information disclosures to consumers and the
use of managed competition by the architects of President Clinton's proposal for health
reform).
50. See, e.g., Paul M. Ellwood & George D. Lundberg, Managed Care: A Work in Progress,
276JAMA 1083, 1083 (1996) (explaining that managed care is designed to enhance quality
while containing cost); Enthoven, supra note 49, at 37 (citing evidence friom the perform-
ance of managed care plans establishing that managed competition will provide "high-
quality, cost-effective, organized systems of care"); see also Agrawal & Veit, supra note 47, at 41
("The managed care industry promised to control health care spending while improving
patient outcomes and consumer satisfaction.").
51. See John V. Jacobi, After Managed Care: Gray Boxes, Tiers and Consumerism, 47 ST.
Louis U. L.J. 397, 397-98 (2003) (arguing that the ascendancy of managed care constituted
piecemeal reform).
52. Agrawal & Veit, supra note 47, at 38-39 (explaining that employers turned to man-
aged care as a response to the price increases of more traditional coverage).
53. See Cathy A. Cowan et al., Burden of Health Care Costs: Businesses, Households, and Gov-
ernments, 1987-2000, 23 HEALTH CARE FIN. REv. 131, 136-37 (2002) (describing the
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again hit double-digit rates in this decade,54 and shows every sign of
continuing well in excess of background inflation for years to
55
come.
Managed care, then, has failed to stabilize American health fi-
nance. What lead to the failure-or, as Professor Jacobson has
asked, who killed managed care?56 Commentators have attributed
managed care's failure to many causes, including excess litigation,
over-regulation, the short-sighted stubbornness of consumers, and
the recalcitrance of physicians.5 But managed care firms them-
selves clearly bear some of the responsibility for the failure of
managed care to bring to fruition its potential offered as an orga-
nizing principle in health coverage.58 If experience with the failure
of the managed care revolution is to be instructive in the assess-
ment of consumer-driven health care, it is helpful to assess what
caused the theory and practice of managed care to diverge. In the-
ory, managed care promised to serve two functions: cost control
and quality improvement.'9 In practice, however, managed care
reduction in health inflation in 1990s); John K. Inglehart, Changing Health Insurance Trends,
347 NEw ENG.J. MED. 956, 957 (2002) ("In the period from 1994 to 1997, as managed-care
plans reduced spending, annual increases in premiums and overall health care expenditures
were remarkably small .. ").
54. See Gabel et al., supra note 21, at 118 (noting that premiums rose 13.9% in 2003,
"the third consecutive year of double-digit increases"); Inglehart, supra note 53, at 957
(documenting the return of health care expenditure inflation).
55. See Stephen Heffler et al., Health Spending Projections Through 2013, HEALTH Arr.
WEB EXCLUSIVE W4-79, W4-83 to W4-84 (Feb. 11, 2004), at http://content.healthaffairs.org/
cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w4.79vl (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform)
("[H]ealth spending will grow at an average annual rate that is 2.1 percentage points faster
than economic growth over the projection period [of 2004-2013] and eventually reach 18.4
percent of GDP. .. ").
56. See Peter D. Jacobson, Who Killed Managed Care? A Policy Whodunit, 47 ST. Louis U.
L.J. 365, 368-69 (2003).
57. See David A. Hyman, Managed Care at the Millennium: Scenes from a Maul, 24 J.
HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 1061, 1068-69 (1999) (blaming unreflective consumer advocates
and legislators insufficiently versed in economic theory); Jacobson, supra note 56, at 267
(identifying physicians, patients, legislators, the judicial system, the media, health insurers,
employers, and hospitals as suspects in the death of managed care); Alain C. Enthoven,
Employment-Based Health Insurance is Failing: Now What?, HEALTH AFF. WEB EXCLUSIVE W3-
237, W3-238 (May 28, 2003), at http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/
hlthaff.w3.237vl (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) ("Man-
aged care has broken down under an onslaught from lawyers, politicians, consumers, and
doctors.").
58. See Alain C. Enthoven & Sara J. Singer, Unrealistic Expectations Born of Defective Insti-
tutions, 24 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 931, 935-36 (1999) (explaining that managed care
plans bear some responsibility for the managed care backlash by "resist[ing] market-
improving legislation" and focusing single-mindedly on cost-control); Havighurst, supra note
20, at 74-77 (2002) (attributing the failure of managed care in part to the failure of plans to
carry through on managed care's theoretical promise of being open with consumers).
59. See Agrawal &Veit, supra note 47, at 41.
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plans responded to a marketplace that valued price,0 whether be-
cause the structure of third-party health coverage created agency
problems, 6' because employees lacked appropriate information 2 or
the ability to use it,63 or because members lacked the ability to
choose their plan.6 The imbalance between the cornerstone con-
cerns of quality improvement and cost containment, in favor of the
latter, goes a long way in explaining the loss of trust in managed
care.65 This loss of trust caused by over-emphasis on cost contain-
ment then caused the consumer backlash that lead to expansion of
provider networks, plan withdrawal from utilization review, and
other steps that caused managed care plans to raise their premi-
ums.66 The deviation between health finance theory and practice
scuttled the enterprise of reform.
60. See CONSUMER-DRIVEN HEALTH CARE, supra note 7, at XXIV (explaining that most
managed care plans abandoned the quality improvement goal and focused instead on bar-
gaining with providers to reduce price); Michael H. Bailit, Perspective: Ominous Signs and
Portents: A Purchaser's View of Health Care Market Trends, HEALTH AFF., Nov.-Dec. 1997, at 85,
86 ("[P]urchasers and consumers seldom buy because of quality of care. Instead, purchasing
decisions are based on cost, network size, and administrative convenience. Few purchasers
have ever terminated an HMO contract because the quality... was poor compared with that
of an HMO's competitors."); David M. Frankford, Regulating Managed Care: Pulling the Tails to
Wag the Dogs, 24J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 1191, 1198 (1999) ("[T]he dream of getting
plans to compete over quality remains just that, a dream. The dominant form of competi-
tion among managed care plans is likely to remain price competition .... ") (citation
omitted).
61. SeeJacobson, supra note 56, at 376-77 (noting the divergence of benefits design in-
terest between employees and employers).
62. See Havighurst, supra note 20, at 76-77 (noting that managed care plans failed to
communicate their methods to members);Jacobi, supra note 51, at 401 (noting that man-
aged care plans' control over medical practice was characterized by "reticence, even
secrecy").
63. See Henry J. Aaron, A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to Managed Competition, 27 J.
HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 31, 31-32 (2002) (suggesting that one failure of the managed care
revolution was that consumers behaved with "less than perfect rationality"); Russell Korob-
kin, The Efficiency of Managed Care "Patient Protection" Laws: Incomplete Contracts, Bounded
Rationality, and Market Failure, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 48-52 (1999) (describing the limita-
tions of rational choice in health care consumerism).
64. See Entihoven, supra note 57, at W?,-240 to W3-241 (describing the common prac-
tice of employers offering their employees a "single source" of coverage); Marc A. Rodwin,
Exit and Voice in American Health Care, 32 U. MICH J.L. REFORM 1041, 1056 (1999) (arguing
that the power of "exit" as a consumer protection device is limited by the lack of choice in
plans employers offer their employees).
65. See Havighurst, supra note 20, at 7-77.
66. See Robinson, supra note 29, at 2623 (arguing that managed care providers lost
"the will to fight against US popular culture and political institutions" and abandoned much
of their cost-containing business plans due to the backlash against managed care).
Managed care methods have not been abandoned entirely. The resurgence of cost has
led to suggestions of a "managed care rebound" in some markets, as plans have increased
utilization review methods, tightened their networks, and otherwise tentatively returned to
the basics of managed care. See Glen P. Mays et al., Managed Care Rebound? Recent Changes in
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C. After Managed Care: Cutting Out the Middle Man?
Consumer-driven health care is fundamentally about "getting
[health plans] out from between the consumer and the services
the consumer wants to consume."67 To an extent, theory supports
the movement to "disintermediated" plans,6s excoriating managed
care for assuming "patient ignorance,"69 and advancing patient di-
rected plans as means to advance consumer autonomy and contain
costs.70 The move is also supported by the desire of employers to
reduce their own financial exposure for increasing health costs by
shifting part of the responsibility for costs to their employees. 71 And
it is in part merely an evolution of commercial managed care
products, and their increased use of varied cost-sharing and prod-
uct offerings to maintain market share and remain profitable.
One form advocated for consumer-driven health care does not
fit this disintermediation mold. To the contrary, it bucks the trend
by advocating a complex system in which consumers benefit from a
standardization of plans that compete on the basis of quality and
Health Plans' Cost Containment Strategies, HEALTH AFF. WEB EXCLUSIVE W4-427, W4-429 to W4-
433 (Aug. 11, 2004), at http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w4.427vl (on
file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
67. See James C. Robinson, Renewed Emphasis on Consumer Cost Sharing in Health Insur-
ance Benefit Design, HEALTH AFF. WEB EXCLUSIVE W139, W145 (Mar. 20, 2002), at
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w2.139vl (on file with the University of
Michigan Journal of Law Reform) ("[H] ealth plans increasingly interpret their role as one
of packaging health care services, pricing them at actuarially sustainable rates, gathering
and disseminating information, promoting electronic connectivity among all participants,
and otherwise getting out from between the consumer and the services the consumer wants
to consume.").
68. SeeJohn V. Jacobi & Nicole Huberfeld, Quality Control, Enterprise Liability, and Disin-
termediation in Managed Care, 29 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 305, 310 (2002) ("[Tjhe role of the
fiscal intermediary between employees and their health providers ... is reduced or elimi-
nated [in the disintermediation movement].").
69. John C. Goodman, Designing Health Insurance for the Information Age, in CONSUMER-
DRIVEN HEALTH CARE: IMPLICATIONS FOR PROVIDERS, PAYERS, AND POLICYMAKER 224-26
(Regina Herzlinger ed., 2004).
70. Id. at 235-39. See also Jacobi, supra note 51, at 406 ("The promise of most con-
sumer-driven plans is that consumers themselves can act as prudent purchasers if given the
chance, obviating the need for managed care plans to act as expert intermediaries between
consumers and providers.... .").
71. See Wendy K. Mariner, Can Consumer Choice Plans Satisfy Patients? Problems with Theory
and Practice in Health Insurance Contracts, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 485, 504-05 (2004) (describing
the cost benefits to employers of various types of new health plans).
72. See Inglehart, supra note 53, at 958-60 (describing the evolution of health plans to
increase cost sharing and use "tiers" of benefits); Gabel et al., supra note 2, at W399 to W400
(describing established insurance firms expanding cost sharing and patient choice in meas-
ured response to market pressures).
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service. Employees are given a choice from among many of these
plans, and provided (by the employer) with robust information on
the various plans.3 A key component of this reform is that provid-
ers are rewarded in the market for providing efficient, expert care,
particularly for high-cost conditions. This reward comes both in
terms of the presumed market reward that follows the dispersal of
quality information to all consumers,74 and also from differential,
risk-adjusted pricing that directly rewards successful, efficient
treatment. 5 If this sounds familiar, it is; advocacy of this form of
consumer-driven health care is simply a call to adopt managed
competition, the managed care-centered program that Alain En-
thoven and other have suggested for over two decades. 6 The merits
of a renewed call for managed care-based managed competition is
beyond the scope of this paper.7  The argument in favor of such a
plan has, and always has had, a great deal of appeal. However, a
managed competition model probably presupposes the continued
viability of managed care plans or their close cousins,78 and sub-
stantial governmental oversight.79 The appeal of this solution to the
health finance crisis is substantial, but seems to buck the trend of
disintermediation and patient autonomy. As is described below,
73. See Agrawal & Veit, supra note 47, at 46-49 (proposing mandates to require em-
ployers to offer several managed care plans, other plans, and comparative cost and quality
information to employees); Enthoven, supra note 57, at W3-243 to W3-245.
74. See Michael E. Porter & Elizabeth Olmsted Teisberg, Redefining Competition in Health
Care, HARV. Bus. REv.,June 2004, at 65, 74 (explaining that a condition of "redefined" com-
petition in health care is the availability of information to consumers).
75. See Enthoven, supra note 57, at W3-243 to W3-246 (arguing that risk adjustment is
an integral part of a properly functioning and efficient system, and that technology to ac-
complish genuine risk adjustment is available but underused).
76. See Agrawal & Veit, supra note 47, at 25-27.
77. Also beyond the scope of this paper is the variation on the theme of managed
competition in which consumers are permitted to mix and match to create their own net-
works in a do-it-yourself PPO. See Mariner, supra note 71, at 503-04 (describing programs
that permit consumers to "design their own customized health plans"); Gabel et al., supra
note 2, at W397-99 (describing entrepreneurial start-ups offering do-it-yourself services in
conjunction with internet-based information systems on providers). This neither fish nor
fowl approach has little market support. It seems unlikely that consumers, already famously
reluctant to take the time to review information on health plan quality, will take the time to
create their own networks.
78. See Agrawal & Veit, supra note 47, at 45-49 (describing a "back to the future" pro-
posal featuring managed care plans); Enthoven, supra note 57, at W3-243 to W3-244.
79. See Agrawal & Veit, supra note 47, at 48 (proposing federal requirements for the
disclosure of quality data to consumers); Porter & Teisberg, supra note 74, at 74-75 (advocat-
ing federally mandated uniform benefits floors and universal coverage); Enthoven, supra
note 57, at W3-247 ("Congress could enact strong incentives for employers to create and
join multiemployer, multicarrier exchanges.... Congress could create a regulatory body to
be sure that exchanges actually promote competition and expand the competitive mar-
ket.").
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however, some melding of consumer direction and case manage-
ment of high-cost cases may be the brightest hope for the future."s
The plan envisioned by Agrawal and Veit does not yet have a pres-
ence in the market.
Most forms of consumer-driven health care are milder or
stronger attempts to avoid reliance on expert intermediaries, and
emphasize reliance on consumers themselves to achieve the cost,
quality, and access goals of health finance.8' The spectrum of con-
sumer-driven arrangements, aside from those discussed above that
encourage consumers to exercise informed choice in their health
plan selection, runs from the mild attempt, in which consumers
are given tiered pricing incentives to internalize some of the mar-
ginal costs of expensive providers, to the stronger attempt, in
which consumers are given the power and responsibility of choos-
ing their care and their provider, at least for a portion of the
services they receive.
Consumer-driven plan cost containment rests in general on the
observation, supported by common sense and robust empirical
evidence, that raising the amount of health costs directly borne by
consumers will reduce consumers' consumption of health care ser-
vices.82 The simplest way for health plans to couple this basic cost-
containment device with a means for consumers to exercise greater
autonomy in health care choices is to key member cost-sharing to
the price of the service; for example, a physician charging the plan
a high price could be accessed only with a high co-payment, while a
lower-priced physician (to the plan) could be seen with a lower co-
payment.83 This use of tiers permits members to choose from a
broad range of providers, but forces them to bear a part of the ex-
cess cost, thereby presumably damping their enthusiasm for the
most expensive providers.
This practice is most common in pharmaceutical benefits, where
most plans now separate available drugs into three tiers-generic
80. See infra Part IV.C.
81. See Goodman, supra note 69, at 235-39 (emphasizing informed consumer choice
and direct consumer power to select care); see alsoJacobi, supra note 51, at 406 ("The prom-
ise of most consumer-driven plans is that consumers themselves can act as prudent
purchasers if given the chance, obviating the need for managed care plans to act as expert
intermediaries between consumers and providers . ").
82. See MARK A. HALL, MAKING MEDICAL SPENDING DECISIONS: THE LAW, ETHICS, AND
ECONOMICS OF RATIONING DECISIONS 26 (1997) ("Empirical studies verify that patients sub-
ject to increased cost sharing spend dramatically less on health care than those who are fully
insured."). See generally JOSEPH P. NEWHOUSE & INSURANCE EXPERIMENT GROUP, FREE FOR
ALL? LESSONS FROM THE RAND- HEALTH INSURANCE EXPERIMENT (1993) (describing and
analyzing the RAND Health Insurance Experiment).
83. SeeJacobi, supra note 51, at 403-04.
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drugs, lower-cost name brand drugs, and higher-cost name brand
drugs-with co-payments rising from tier to tier.84 The practice has
spread to other services, including physicians and hospitals.5 This
practice serves the plan's interests in extricating itself somewhat
from its mediating role, while maintaining some level of incentive
for employees to use lower-cost providers:
An emerging set of health insurance benefit designs seeks to
retain some of the advantages of provider coordination while
broadening consumer choice. Rather than arm-wrestling with
doctors and medical groups under the implicit threat of net-
work exclusion, these insurance products include any willing
physician and network organization but pass the differences
in fee levels on to the consumers through higher premiums
or co-payments. At the extreme, these insurance product de-
signs do not negotiate fees at all, creating a market that
permits providers to charge whatever they think their patients
are willing to pay and that permits consumers to choose
among all providers rather than be limited to a contracted
subset. The premium charged to the employer covers most or
all of the fees charged by low-cost providers, while the em-
ployee pays the full incremental cost of the fees charged by
more expensive providers.86
The move to pricing tiers allows a half step between more tradi-
tional forms of managed care and fuller forms of consumer-driven
care. At lower levels of price differentiation between tiers, these
plans are nearly indistinguishable from traditional PPOs, which
offer greater or lesser coverage for in-plan and out-of-plan provid-
ers.87 At moderate levels of differentiation, consumers may be
bearing a substantial share of the marginal costs of higher-priced
84. See Haiden A Huskamp et al., The Effect of Incentive-Based Formularies on Prescription
Drug Utilization and Spending, 349 NEw ENc. J. MED. 2224, 2225 (2003) ("As of spring 2002,
57 percent of workers in the United States who had drug benefits were enrolled in plans
with a three-tier formulary."); Geoffrey F Joyce et al., Employer Drug Benefit Plans and Spending
on Prescription Drugs, 288 JAMA 1733, 1734 (2002) (describing the range of co-payment
schemes in drug benefit plans).
85. SeeJacobi, supra note 51, at 403; James C. Robinson, Hospital Tiers in Health Insur-
ance: Balancing Consumer Choice with Financial Incentives, HEALTH AFF. WEB EXCLUSIVE W3-
135, W3-140 to W3-141 (Mar. 19 2003), at http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/
hlthaff.w3.135vl (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform); Robinson,
supra note 67, at W147 to W148.
86. Robinson, supra note 67, at W147 to W148.
87. See Mays et al., supra note 66, at W4-432 to W4-433 (discussing how many tiered
networks offer very small savings and place very few providers in the highest-cost tier).
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providers. At very high levels of price differentiation, members may
perceive the plan's "coverage" of high-tier providers to be illusory.
But even the aggressive use of tiers fails to address some central
concerns of the consumer-driven health care movement. To the
extent plans screen out some providers before creating tiers, they
still mediate between consumers and their choice of health care at
some autonomy cost to members. And to the extent the graduated
co-payments only signal, rather than pass on, the marginal cost of
expensive providers, plans merely use proxies for market costs in-
stead of employing them directly.
The more stark break with traditional health plans comes with
the consumer-driven plan that combines a spending account with a
high-deductible plan, an option that is much discussed,88 much
supported by recent changes in law,89 and slowly finding a place in
the market.90 The next section describes how these more paradig-
matic consumer-driven plans are constructed.
II. WILL CONSUMER-DRIVEN HEALTH CARE WoRK? THE DEBATE
Arguments about consumer-driven health care range between
philosophical concerns about the nature of society and markets,
the imperatives to treat health care as a social cost and respect in-
dividual judgments of market participants, and the predictive and
pragmatic merits of various proposals for health finance reform.
This section will, first, describe what is likely to be the structure of a
typical consumer-driven health plan (CDHP). This description is
based on the new requirements of the Medicare Modernization
Act,9' recent guidance from the Internal Revenue Service,92 and the
example of a plan available in 2004 to members of the American
88. See generally CONSUMER-DRIVEN HEALTH CARE, supra note 7; Pauly and Goodman,
supra note 1; Gabel et al., supra note 2.
89. See infra text accompanying notes 111-14.
90. SeeJon Christianson et al., Defined-Contribution Health Insurance Products: Development
and Prospects, HEALTH AFF., Jan.-Feb. 2002, at 49, 50 (describing the high visibility but low
market penetration of spending accounts with high deductibles); James C. Robinson, Rein-
vention of Health Insurance in the Consumer Era, 291 JAMA 1880, 1882 (2004) ("The most
discussed, if least-purchased, contemporary innovation in benefit design is a product that
combines a high-deductible PPO with an employer-financed but employee-managed and tax
exempt health savings account....").
91. See Medicare Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 108-173, sec. 1201, 117 Stat. 2066,
2469-79 (2003).
92. See Rev. Rul. 2002-41, 2002-2 C.B. 75; I.R.S. Notice 2002-45, 2002-2 C.B. 93.
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Postal Workers Union.93 It also relies on an assumption that cost
concerns and a preference for administrative ease will predomi-
nate in product design here, as it did with managed care.94 Second,
it will provide a brief overview of the arguments for and against a
shift to consumer-driven plans.
The next section then asks how consumer-driven care will affect
people with chronic illnesses. This analysis is not proposed merely
out of a Rawlsian desire to assess the effects of the policy on the
least well-off in society in health access terms.9 Rather, it is a "quick
look" test96 to evaluate the plausibility of consumer-driven care as a
means of achieving certain essential goals of health finance reform:
restraining cost inflation, making plausible a reduction in the
number of people without health insurance coverage, 97 and serving
the first two goals without harming, and perhaps even improving,
the quality of care provided. I argue that consumer-driven care
presents grave risks to the coverage of people with disabilities. I
further argue that this fault goes to the heart of the plausibility of
consumer-directed care. The great majority of health care is con-
sumed each year by a small fraction of the sickest Americans.
People with chronic illnesses are disproportionately represented in
this group of the sickest year-in and year-out. If real consumer-
driven care-not the form talked about, but the form that shows
up-fails to address the health finance needs of the chronically ill,
93. See APWU HEALTH PLAN, FEDERAL EMPLOYEES HEALTH BENEFITS PROGRAM 49-74
(2004), available at http://www.apwuhp.com/openseason/2004Brochure.pdf (on file with
the University of Michigan Journal 6f Law Reform) [hereinafter APWUHP BROCHURE]. I
use the postal worker plan, even though it was designed before the passage of the Medicare
Modernization Act, because its details are publicly available, well explained, and largely in
conformance with the terms of the Medicare Modernization Act. Its structure is typical of
plans emerging in the marketplace. See Anthony T. Lo Sasso et al., Tales From the New Frontier:
Pioneers' Experiences with Consumer-Driven Health Care, 39 HEALTH SERVICES RES. 1071, 1078
(2004) (describing CDHP designs); Stephen T. Parente et al., Employee Choice of Consumer-
Driven Health Insurance in a Multiplan, Multiproduct Setting, 39 HEALTH SERVICES RES. 1091,
1095 (2004) (describing CDHP plan designs).
94. See Bailit, sutbra note 60, at 86.
95. See JOHN RAwLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 303 (1971) ("All social primary goods-
liberty and opportunity, income and wealth, and the bases of self-respect-are to be distrib-
uted equally unless an unequal distribution of any or all of these goods is to the advantage
of the least favored.").
96. The "quick look" terminology is borrowed from the anti-trust context. See, e.g., Ma-
rina Lao, Comment: The Rule of Reason and Horizontal Restraints Involving Professionals, 68
Antitrust LJ. 499, 502-03 (2000) (describing the "quick look" test in cases brought under
the Sherman Act).
97. No one claims that a move to consumer-direct care directly reduces the number of
uninsured persons. It is beyond dispute, however, that reducing the number of uninsured
persons depends on, or at a minimum is aided by, a reduction in the rate of inflation of the
cost of coverage. See Havinghurst, supra note 48, at 17-19.
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it will, like managed care, end up a failed attempt to use market
tools to tame health inflation.
A. The Structure of "True" Consumer-Driven Health Care
The central form of CDHP has three parts-or maybe two parts
and a gap.9s In a very simple incarnation,99 CDHP provides, first, for
payment of an amount into a Health Savings Account (HSA) that
the consumer and her dependents may use for payment of health
expenses.' °° Second, it provides a deductible that the consumer
must pay out of her own funds after exhausting the HSA. Third, it
provides insurance that attaches after the consumer has expended
the HSA contribution and deductible. The insurance may have co-
payments, subject to out-of-pocket limits, as does more traditional
insurance."" Consumers, then, would have substantial control over
and responsibility for their health spending. This, of course, is the
raison d'etre for CDHPs: to reverse or blunt the effect of moral
hazard, the artificial willingness to overspend that may follow from
traditional third-party insurance, and that is often described as the
basis for high American health care costs.
At one end, the plan provides a tax-favored HSA spending ac-
count for the employee from which the employee can purchase
health care services.' At the other end, the plan provides some-
thing resembling a traditional PPO, but with coverage that does
not attach until the employee has incurred a large deductible.
The plan then ordinarily requires the employee to pay an
98. SeeJon B. Christianson et al., Consumer Experiences in a Consumer-Driven Health Plan,
39 HEALTH SERVICES RES. 1123, 1123-24 (2004) (describing benefit plans with "insurance
coverage designed to create a 'gap' between the dollars in the account and the level at
which a deductible is reached").
99. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
100. See Medicare Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 108-173, sec. 1201, 117 Stat. 2066,
2469-79 (2003).
101. E.g. Medicare Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 108-173, sec. 1201, § 223(c)(2), 117
Stat. 2066, 2471-72 (2003) (defining high deductible health plan for purposes of the Act).
102. See, e.g., Bloche, supra note 33, at 260-66 (describing the use of moral hazard in
analyzing health insurance structure). See generally Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral Haz-
an, 75 TEx. L. Rzv. 237 (1996); William M. Sage, Managed Care's Crimea: Medical Necessity,
Therapeutic Benefit and the Goals of Administrative Process in Health Insurance, 53 Du, L.J. 597,
606-07 (2003) (discussing managed care mechanisms intended to counter moral hazard).
103. See Medicare Modernization Act § 223(a), 117 Stat. at 2469.
104. E.g. Medicare Modernization Act § 223(c) (2), 117 Stat. at 2471-72.
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additional deductible,' although this additional deductible is not
required for the savings account to maintain favored tax status. 
°6
How do these three parts fit together?
1. The Health Savings Account-HSAs are the heart of CDHPs.
Through this mechanism, the plans give members a sense of own-
ership over the funds and encourage them to be careful purchasers
of health services.0 7 Consumers are encouraged to participate in a
genuine market for health care services, making judgments, as with
any consumer purchase, as to the utility of spending versus saving
"their" money. Several conditions encourage this sense of owner-
ship. A consumer is likely to feel greater ownership of funds, and
therefore use greater care in spending them, if his ownership
rights do not disappear on an arbitrary date such as the end of the
tax year. In 2002, the IRS facilitated the expansion of CDHPs when
it ruled that unspent funds in a spending account could roll over
from tax year to tax year, thereby maintaining the funds' tax-
favored status.0 8 The Medicare Modernization Act codified that
result in statute. 19 The sense of ownership is also enhanced if the
funds not only continue from year to year, but in addition can be
converted to other uses if not spent on health care."0 Prior to the
passage of the Medicare Modernization Act, funds in spending ac-
counts could only be used for medical services. The Act, however,
permits the funds to be withdrawn after the beneficiary reaches
retirement age with no penalty, and is subject to tax only as ordi-
nary income; the spending account, under those circumstances,
converts to the functional equivalent of an individual retirement
account."'
105. E.g., Gabel et al., supra note 2, at W396 ("When the account is exhausted, enrollees
must typically pay out of pocket until the annual deductible is met, after which the plan
becomes a traditional major medical plan.").
106. See Medicare Modernization Act § 223(a), 117 Stat. at 2469 (permitting the
amount of deduction to equal the amount of contribution to the health savings account).
107. See Mark V. Pauly & John C. Goodman, lx Credits for Health Insurance and Medicai
Savings Accounts, HEALTH AFF., Spring 1995, at 126, 130 (arguing that consumers assigned
funds in a medical savings account will be incentivized to use them cost-effectively).
108. See Rev. Rul. 2002-41, 2002-2 C.B. 75; I.R.S. Notice 2002-45, 2002-2 C.B. 93.
109. Medicare Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 108-173, sec. 1201, § 223(a), 117 Stat.
2066, 2471-72 (2003).
110. See Pauly & Goodman, supra note 107, at 130 (explaining that incentives to over-
spend on medical care are enhanced if funds in the spending account "can eventually be
used for purposes other than medical services").
111. See Medicare Modernization Act § 223(a). See also Barry Salkin, Health Savings Ac-
count: A New Defined Contribution Health Plan, 72 PRAc. TAx STRATEGIES 196, 199 (2004)
(describing a retirement tax benefit).
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This mechanism is aimed at blunting the effect of moral hazard.
Employees "own" funds available to cover a portion of health ex-
penditures. When faced with a spending decision, they will tend to
balance more carefully the cost of a proposed service against the
benefits, as they have a much more direct stake in the expenditure
than in a system in which they are wholly or partially covered by
third-party insurance. If, as many acerbic critics of current third-
party insurance insist, the single greatest cause of health inflation is
the absence of a true consumer-driven market for health care, then
HSAs are central to changes in health insurance.1 2 In a simple
package, they address the frustration consumers express about in-
terference with medical judgments, and address plan sponsors'
concerns about health cost increases.
In the postal worker plan, the plan deposits $1000 per year in
the HSA for a member selecting individual coverage, and $2,000
for members electing family coverage.!1 The medical expenses for
which funds can be used are somewhat broadly defined to extend
to goods and services not covered under the alternative, traditional
plan; for example, the funds can be used for dental service, eye-
glasses, and contact lenses.11 4 There are, however, limits on
spending from the HSA, reflecting the plan sponsor's continued
exercise of some level of control over fund utilization; orthodontia
and cosmetic dentistry cannot be accessed using HSA funds, for
example. In fact, HSA funds may be used only for services covered
under the traditional plan and a short list of additional services. "
Members may use in-network providers when spending these funds
(and receive in-network prices), but they are not limited to them.""
112. See CONSUMER-DRIVEN HEALTH CARE, supra note 7, at 58 (identifying the fact that
health care systems are guided by someone other than the consumer as the cause of massive
health care expenditures); GOODMAN & MUSGRAVE, supra note 1, at 12 ("In most other sec-
tors of our economy, individuals who make decisions realize most of the benefit from good
ones and bear most of the cost of bad ones.... The market for health care could be organ-
ized in a similar way.").
113. APWUHP BROCHURE, supra note 93, at 49. The plan refers to the spending ac-
count as a Personal Care Account (PCA). Id. The disparate terminology might be explained
by the fact that the brochure applies to 2004 coverage, and the Medicare Modernization Act
was not signed into law until December 8, 2003. Medicare Modernization Act, Pub. L. No.
108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (2003).
114. APWUHP BROCHURE, supra note 93, at 53.
115. Id. This is a residual check on members' excess health spending; the Medicare
Modernization Act permits HSA funding of any "qualified medical expense" recognized
under the tax code. Medicare Modernization Act sec. 1201, § 223(d), 117 Stat. at 2472-73
(2003).
116. APWUHP BROCHURE, supra note 93, at 18, 52.
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Unused funds roll over to the next year, although here again,
the plan reflects a compromise between strong principles of con-
sumer ownership of HSA funds and the sponsor's desire to exercise
some level of continuing control over expenditures for cost-
containment reasons. The plan limits the accumulation of funds in
the HSA to $4000 for individual coverage, and $6000 for family
coverage.'17 The amounts that may be accumulated are substantial,
encouraging thrift among members. But additional HSA funds
take on a "use it or lose it" character once the cap has been
reached, flipping the incentive toward spending. In contrast, the
Medicare Modernization Act permits HSA funds to roll over with-
out limit, permitting accumulated funds to serve primarily as a
source for medical spending, but ultimately as a source of retire-
ment funds. 118 The President's Council of Economic Advisors has
singled out this strong consumer ownership provision of the Medi-
care Modernization Act as a particularly important aspect of the
cost-containment value of consumer-driven health care:
Once [an HSA is] established, this money belongs to the indi-
vidual and can accumulate over time. The account remains
with the individual if he or she changes employers. * * * With
less reliance on insurance for routine health expenses, con-
sumers would place a greater value on information about
health care options and providers. More prudent use of in-
surance would also reduce "middle-man" costs involving an
insurance company in what could otherwise be a simple
transaction between the patient and the caregiver"
HSAs, then, provide a fund, considerably under the control of
consumers, from which a broad range of health services may be
purchased. The postal worker plan adheres to this vision, but with
a couple of compromises by which the plan sponsors assert some
continued oversight over member spending. The Medicare Mod-
ernization Act permits a purer version of consumer control over
the spending account. It is evident that the temptation of plan
sponsors to fiddle with the theory in the interest of cost control will
be substantial.
2. The Gap: A Deductible to Reach Insurance Coverage-The second
element of consumer-driven plans is somewhat chimerical, as it is a
117. APWUHP BROCHURE, supra note 93, at 53.
118. Medicare Modernization Act § 223(d).
119. 2004 COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISORS ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 199-200.
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void-a gap in coverage that (sometimes, but not necessarily) ex-
ists between the limits of a HSA and the attachment point of the
high-deductible health plan. The effect of this additional deducti-
ble is additive to that produced by the member's ownership of the
HSA funds: it minimizes the distortions attributed to the moral
hazard associated with third-party insurance. 20 The arguments for
the cost-containing effects of HSAs based on a member's sense of
ownership for the funds apply even more directly to an additional
deductible, as the out-of-pocket funds are literally owned by the
member. A sponsor particularly worried about moral hazard might
reasonably be reluctant to construct a plan in which the amount
contributed to the HSA equaled the amount of the insurance
plan's deductible (although such a plan would meet the criteria set
121in the Medicare Modernization Act for favorable tax treatment).
Members with a balance in a HSA equaling the deductible of their
insurance plan may, notwithstanding some contingent full owner-
ship of the funds in the future, simply regard the plan as first-
dollar coverage: the HSA funds are to be used until exhausted, at
which time PPO coverage attaches.1
2
The postal plan has such a buffer. In their first year of member-
ship, members have an additional deductible of $600 for single
coverage and $1200 for family coverage after they have exhausted
their spending accounts.12 The ability of members to roll their un-
spent HSA balances forward, however, could reduce or eliminate
the deductible in subsequent years. If, for example, a member with
120. See Pauly & Goodman, supra note 107, at 129 (arguing that moral hazard can be
combatted by setting up a system in which plan members pay at least some expenses out of
pocket).
121. See Medicare Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 108-173, sec. 1201, § 223(a), 117 Stat.
2066, 2469 (2003) (stating that payments into an HSA equaling the deductible of the high
deductible health plan are permissible as a tax matter).
122. If a personal spending account is constructed to be truly the consumer's, going
with him fromjob to job and converting to a retirement fund after he reaches the age of 65,
then moral hazard is substantially lessened as an inflationary concern. See 2004 COUNCIL OF
ECONOMIC ADVISORS ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 199-200 ("With such accounts, there
is an increased incentive to purchase insurance that only covers events that are truly random
and large, and to pay for other expenses using an HSA."). Under this reasoning, adding an
additional deductible feels like a belt-and-suspenders move unless it is merely a measure to
reduce the cost of coverage by shifting costs to the consumer.
123. APWUHP BROCHURE, supra note 93, at 54. The freedom of choice promised by the
"ownership" of the HAS is further restricted. Although the spending account can be used
for some expenditures not covered by the traditional plan, those expenditures do not count
toward the deductible that must be incurred before accessing PPO coverage. Id. at 53. For
example, if the member spent $500 of her spending account on dental services and out-of-
network preventive care, she would have to pay both the $500 and the $600 deductible be-
fore being eligible for PPO coverage.
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single coverage rolled over $600 of the $1000 in her HSA from year
one, she would have a $1600 balance at the beginning of year two,
and could reach her deductible of $1600 to gain access to PPO
coverage with no out-of-pocket spending.'1 4 The deductible, then,
does not pose a barrier to PPO coverage for members who are able
to build up funds in their HSA because they have had few health
care needs in previous years. After the first year of coverage, the
deductible serves as an additional check on spending (and an ad-
ditional direct savings of funds for the plan sponsor) only for those
members who had reason to use the funds in their HSA in previous
years.
3. High Deductible Insurance-Advocates of consumer-driven
health care readily acknowledge that there is a place for health in-
surance in its traditional sense, in which insureds or their sponsors
pool funds against the possibility of large, unexpected health
costs," 5 even though they object to "insurance" coverage of pre-
dictable, routine, and relatively minor expenses.16 Other than the
fact that it has an unusually high deductible, the coverage that at-
taches at the back end of consumer-driven coverage has few novel
issues. There is no reason to think it would not have routine cost-
sharing requirements and in- and out-of-network price differentials
subject to annual out-of-pocket maximums, as does most tradi-
tional health coverage.
The high-deductible coverage at the back end of the postal
worker plan is a traditional PPO. It requires co-payments of 15 per-
cent for most covered services accessed in-network with a cost-
sharing cap of $4500 per year, and a 40 percent co-payment for
most out-of-network services with a cost-sharing cap of $9000 per
year.12 1 It does provide first-dollar coverage for some preventive
124. Id. at 54.
125. See GOODMAN & MUSGRAVE, supra note 1, at 44 (advocating high-deductible insur-
ance); Pauly & Goodman, supra note 107, at 129 (advocating the coupling of individual
spending accounts with catastrophic, high deductible health insurance).
126. See CONSUMER-DRIVEN HEALTH CARE, supra note 7, at 61-64 (likening low-
deductible health insurance to "breakfast insurance" in which one purchases coverage for
the cost of breakfast); GOODMAN & MUSGRAVE, supra note 1, at 58 (criticizing traditional
Medicare for paying for minor expenses that beneficiaries could budget for on a routine
basis, while failing to cover truly catastrophic costs such as custodial nursing home care);
Phil Graham, Why We Need Medical Savings Accounts, 330 NEW ENG.J. MED. 1752, 1752 (1994)
(likening low-deductible health coverage to "grocery insurance").
127. APWUHP BROCHURE, supra note 93, at 19, 56-60. Funds paid from the member's
HSA do not count toward this limit. Id. at 19. In addition, actual out-of-pocket expenditures
of members using out-of-network providers can be substantially higher than $9000, as the
difference between the plan allowance-the fee set by the plan for a service-and the actual
fee charged by a provider is not counted toward the cap. Id. at 56-60.
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care, including a routine preventive office visit, routine immuniza-
tions, and some routine diagnostic tests. 28 This compromise with
the tenet that insurance should not cover minor, predictable ex-
penses acknowledges the benefit and cost-effectiveness of
encouraging plan members to use preventive health services, and
is consistent with the definition of a "high deductible health plan"
in the Medicare Modernization Act.
12 9
B. Overview of Arguments for and Against Consumer-Driven Care
Many of the issues surrounding consumer-driven care were sub-
ject to analysis and criticism in the 1990s with the introduction of
the Medical Savings Account (MSA). MSAs were advanced as a
market-based alternative to traditional insurance before and after
the 1993-1994 Clinton health reform debate. 3 0 The Health Insur-
ance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) permitted
a limited experiment in tax-advantaged provisions of MSAs.' 3' The
limited experiment bore little fruit,32 perhaps because of the un-
certain future of the products or because managed care seemed to
be holding down health inflation in the late 1990s.133 There was
continuing academic interest in consumer-driven plans, however,3
4
and the resumption of health cost inflation in this decade lead to
an upsurge in entrepreneurial activity advocating a switch to
128. Id. at 50-51. First-dollar coverage for children applies to more frequent routine of-
fice visits. Id. at 51 (applying coverage for "six visits in the first year").
129. Medicare Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 108-173, sec. 1201, § 223(a), 117 Stat.
2066, 2469 (2003) (providing a safe harbor for first-dollar preventive care in high-deductible
plans, permitting a plan to be tax advantaged as a "high deductible health plan" even if it
has no deductible for some preventive care).
130. See GOODMAN & MUSGRAVE, supra note 1, at 57-59; Pauly & Goodman, supra note
107, at 127.
131. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
191, sec. 301, § 220, 110 Stat. 1936, 2037-53 (1996) (permitting a limited experiment with
MSAs).
132. See U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAL SAVINGS ACCOUNTS: RE-
SULTS FROM SURVEYS OF INSURERS, GAO/HEHS-99-34 11 (1998) (noting that sales of MSAs
failed to approach the sales limits permitted by HIPAA).
133. Id.
134. See, e.g., Michael D. Barr, Medical Savings Accounts in Singapore: A Critical Inquiry, 26
J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 709 (2001); William C. Hsiao, Behind the Ideology and Theory: What
Is the Empirical Evidence for Medical Savings Accounts?, 26 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 733
(2001); Regina Jefferson, Medical Savings Accounts: Windfalls for the Healthy, Wealthy & Wise,
48 CATH. U. L. REv. 685 (1999); Greg Scandlen, MSAs Can Be a Windfall for the Rest of Us Too,
49 CATH. U. L. REV 679 (1999).
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consumer-driven care. 135 The buzz created by commentators and
business advocates pushed Congress to resurrect MSAs as HSAs in
the Medicare Modernization Act.
It is not the purpose of this Article to review the literature on the
theoretical debates over consumer-driven care. Complex economic
and philosophical concerns regarding consumer-driven care, how-
ever, will be summarized. Three of them particularly are worth a
brief discussion before moving on: whether consumers desire to
master or are capable of mastering the information and decision-
making skills necessary to make their own health coverage and
care decisions; whether the introduction of consumer-driven care
would splinter the health insurance market, causing harmful dis-
ruptions in coverage; and whether American health finance should
be properly conceived of as a form of social pooling or of individ-
ual protection from catastrophic costs.
The first concern is multifaceted, and addresses the choice issue
central to consumer-driven care. Whether consumer choice will
"work" depends in part on whether consumers can, and will,
choose wisely when given the power to do so. Consumer-driven
care advocates argue that consumers are capable of so choosing if
given access to high-quality, evaluative information.3 6 They also
argue that consumers will take the time to become informed and
therefore will succeed in better gaining access to the services they
desire at a cost below that reflected in mediated systems.' This
positive argument is fueled by adherence to classical economic
market theories; the contrary argument owes more to the strains of
behavioral economics that have criticized assumptions of classically
rational conduct in the health economy. 8 The resolution of this
135. See Christianson et al., supra note 90, at 52-53 (describing the emergence of start-
up firms seeking to manage aspects of consumer-driven health care, along with their venture
capital backers); Gabel et al., supra note 2, at W398 to W399 (detailing firms, including start-
ups and established insurers, inventing or re-inventing themselves as consumer-driven
health plans).
136. E.g. CONSUMER-DRIVEN HEALTH CARE, supra note 7, at 14-17. Adequate informa-
tion is not yet suitably available to consumers. See David Lansky, Providing Information to
Consumers, in CONSUMER-DRIVEN HEALTH CARE: IMPLICATIONS FOR PROVIDERS, PAYERS, AND
POLICYMAKERS 419 (Regina Herzlinger ed., 2004) ("Consumers and purchasers of health
care.., lack the information that can help them evaluate the health care organizations that
achieve better results, use proven medical practices, or best meet patients' expectations.");
Gabel et al., supra note 2, at W400 to W401 ("[T]he most important type of information-
the quality of available providers-is not yet adequate to meet consumer needs").
137. See GOODMAN & MUSGRAVE, supra note 1, at 32-35 (arguing that shifting to a con-
sumer-driven system will encourage the production of expert evaluative information that will
be used by motivated consumers).
138. See Thomas Rice, Can Markets Give Us the Health System We Want?, 22J. HEALTH POL.,
POL'Y & L. 383, 405-11 (1997) (arguing that consumers are often unable to use expert
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dispute turns on principles of economics and psychology that are
in flux and probe the boundaries of individuals' ability to make
rational choices about complex, emotionally-laden health treat-
ments. Evaluation of consumer-driven care from a behavioral
economics perspective is critically important. To the extent con-
sumer autonomy is dangerous to patients, and consumers turn
away from making difficult coverage and treatment decisions, con-
sumer-driven care loses one of its major pillars of support. On the
other hand, as well-informed, adequately supported, and well-
motivated consumers are comfortable and sensible in the role as
master of their health care, consumer-driven care gains support.
The second concern is that adding consumer-driven care as an
option will start a chain of events that could threaten the viability
of more traditional forms of coverage. If care centered around
HSAs appeals to the well, or those who perceive themselves as well,
but not to those with substantial health care needs,"9 negative ef-
fects could flow from such separation. The flight of "good" risks
from traditional plans could raise the per-employee cost of cover-
age in such plans for the plan sponsor, leading the sponsor to
either drop the coverage or increase its employee cost-sharing. 40 If
the "good" risks migrate to the consumer-directed plan, the em-
ployer could experience an increase in costs, as the segment of the
risk pool that uses almost no health care in any year will now be
responsible for the cost of the annual payments to HSAs whether
they spend any of the funds or not.'4 ' These dislocations could de-
feat the cost-containment and quality-enhancing goals of
consumer-directed care unless employers take a far-sighted view of
their obligations to provide coverage to their employees, a view
that has not been broadly evident otherwise.'42 Further study is
information to make complex health decisions, and often have little interest in acquiring
the power to make such decisions).
139. See Gabel et al., supra note 2, at 403 (discussing survey respondents' concern that
younger and healthier employees would gravitate to consumer-driven plans disproportion-
ately). But see Peter Siegelman, Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: An Exaggerated Threat,
113 YALE LJ. 1223, 1225 (2004) (arguing that adverse selection is often an overstated prob-
lem).
140. See Gabel et al., supra note 2, at W403.
141. See id. at W404. The postal plan anticipates this concern and caps the sponsor's ex-
posure by limiting the amount that well members can accumulate in their spending
accounts. APWUHP BROCHURE, supra note 93, at 53.
142. See CONSUMER-DRIVEN HEALTH CARE, supra note 7, at 170-75 (describing a com-
plex risk adjustment mechanism that would reward insurers for providing excellent, cost-
effective care to high-risk employees). The substantial and transparent price differences of
high-risk employees would tempt employers to violate the Americans with Disabilities Act
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necessary to understand the magnitude of this splintering phe-
nomenon and risk-adjustment methods needed to remedy it.
The third concern is whether American health insurance should
be a social welfare system in which we pool our funds to protect the
least lucky of us from both the risk of being denied needed care
and the possibility of becoming impoverished as a result of medical
costs, 143 or instead should be a market-based system by which indi-
viduals choose rationally the most cost-effective means to gain
access to the medical services they desire." As a historical matter,
American health insurance was guided by a sense of mutual aid or
shared risk. 4 1 In the second half of the Twentieth Century, tenden-
cies toward social pooling of risks for the general benefit of all
clashed with tendencies toward honoring individuals' interests in
paying no more in premiums than their health status warranted. 146
The injection of market principles is often advocated as a tactic for
cost control, and universal insurance coverage through govern-
ment subsidy is embraced as consistent with or even necessary toS • 147
the success of market mechanisms. From this perspective, con-
sumer-driven plans are merely attempting to increase the efficiency
and quality of the health system, and do not threaten social solidar-
ity. "8 Others have argued that market-oriented moves in health
and ERISA by shedding an employee whose benefits costs were thousands of dollars higher
than the norm. 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (2000) (ERISA); 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (2000) (ADA).
143. See Melissa B. Jacoby et al., Rethinking The Debates Over Health Care Financing: Evi-
dence From the Bankruptcy Courts, 76 N.Y.U. L. REv. 375, 377 (2001) ("[Mlany families
declared bankruptcy in the aftermath of illness or injury... [using] bankruptcy as a safety
net, or as insurance of last resort, in the financial aftermath of medical problems.").
144. See GOODMAN & MUSGRAVE, supra note 1, at 29-30 (arguing that an ideal health
care system would restore a buyer/seller relationship between patients and medical suppli-
ers and create a financing system in which patients spend their own money).
145. See WILLIAM A. GLASER, HEALTH INSURANCE IN PRACTICE: INTERNATIONAL VARIA-
TIONS IN FINANCING, BENEFITS, AND PROBLEMS 14-21 (1991) (explaining how America
rejected a national health insurance system but health insurance in its early forms exhibited
preference for social solidarity over individualism); John V. Jacobi, The Ends of Health Insur-
ance, 30 U.C. DAvIs L. REv. 311, 315-17 (1997) (noting that American health insurance first
favored social pooling forms).
146. SeeJacobi, supra note 145, at 318-19 (discussing trends in both individualist and
communal directions).
147. See Pauly& Goodman, supra note 107, at 130-31.
148. See GOODMAN & MUSGRAVE, supra note 1, at 657 (arguing that injecting market
forces into health care delivery will reduce waste and increase consumer satisfaction with
services); Mark A. Pauly, Who Was That Straw Man Anyway? A Comment on Evans and Rice, 22J.
HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 467, 467-69 (1997) (defending a market-oriented economic
analysis of health systems as consistent with the social goals of public welfare).
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finance harm social solidarity and pit segments of society against
each other.
49
The American health insurance system is a mixed public/private
system in which aspects of markets and regulation mix in an ever-
changing swirl of activity. When health insurance covers necessary,
(relatively) expensive, and unplanned treatments, there are strong
claims that American democratic norms require equality of access
to this important vehicle of social security.5 0 The arguments are
more attenuated concerning expenditures that are more likely to
be routine, predictable, and (relatively) inexpensive. The line be-
tween these two types of coverage is not a clear one,15 ' but public
policy claims ensuring access to the former are stronger than those
for the latter. 52 A political and philosophical analysis of the proper
mix of collective and individual responsibility for access to health
care and health coverage will continue to guide health reform de-
bate. As consumer-driven plans are likely to appear with increasing
frequency in the near future, tentative and contingent judgments
as to their merits are necessary and, as is described below, possible.
Reform efforts in our public/private health finance system will
benefit from good information on the nature of consumer capa-
bilities in health care and the selection dynamics based on risk and
health status. They will be shaped by common understandings of
social obligation and individual responsibility. This Article does not
pretend to resolve these issues, as it has a narrower purpose. It
takes a "quick look" at the prospects for consumer-driven care's
success or failure on the basis of the single but vitally important
criterion of providing for the chronically ill. Holding aside the
149. Robert G. Evans, Going for the Gold: The Redistributive Agenda Behind Market-Based
Health Reform, 22J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 427, 457-63 (1997) (arguing that market-based
proposals are intentionally or unintentionally a device to redistribute funds away from the
poor and sick to the wealthy and well); Gall Shearer, Commentary--Defined Contribution Health
Plans: Attracting the Healthy and Well-Off 39 HEALTH SERVICES RES. 1159, 1159 (2004)
("[T]he year 2003 may well go down in health care history as the year that the health care
system officially abandoned the premise that the community has a responsibility to care for
each member, replacing it with the philosophy that individuals should each look after them-
selves.").
150. See Deborah A. Stone, Beyond Moral Hazard: Insurance as Moral Opportunity, 6 CONN.
INS. LJ. 11, 43-45 (1999).
151. See infra Part II.B (describing the burden of the cost of predictable but expensive
and necessary care on people with chronic illness).
152. This Article does not address the dispute over defined benefit versus defined con-
tribution plans. The former describes traditional insurance in which members are provided
access to a defined slate of services and subjected to co-payments and deductibles. The latter
describes systems in which members have access to a set level of financial support and may
use the funds to achieve their health coverage goals. See Mariner, supra note 71, at 497 (de-
scribing defined contribution financing).
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larger questions of health care by making a series of reasonable
assumptions, it examines the important ways that care for the
chronically ill drives health expenditures, and then evaluates the
extent to which the adoption of a HSA-anchored model is likely to
affect the problems of financing chronic care.
In making these assessments, the history of managed care sug-
gests examining the plans likely to be available in the marketplace.
The managed care plans that dominated the 1990s bore little re-
semblance to the managed care plans of theoretical imagination.
While commentators in the 1980s and 1990s debated increasingly
interesting and complex issues associated with the theory of man-
aged care, the market adopted stripped-down constructs created to
contain cost. Similarly, the plans likely to be available in the near
future will bear little relationship to theoretical constructions, but
instead will be cost-saving measures shaped by the level of regula-
tion governing their activity. The next section will examine the
patient-directed cognate to those HMOs against the needs of the
health economy to provide coverage for people with chronic ill-
nesses.
III. WILL CONSUMER-DRIVEN CARE WORK?
Focus ON THE CHRONICALLY ILL
A. Health Reform Must Account for Chronic Illness
As managed care was working its way to market dominance in
the 1990s, it slowly became clear that managed care in practice fo-
cused overwhelmingly on cost control, as opposed to its theoretical
focus on increasing quality while reducing cost through reorgani-
zation. Theorized managed care continued, but as actual managed
care developed market share, the scholarly analysis turned to the
more practical question of the effect the managed care financing
conversion was having on the cost and quality of care. The reviews
were mixed-decidedly more so than managed care theory would
have lead us to expect.'53 Theorizing about consumer-driven care is
153. See, e.g., Donald M. Berwick, Payment by Capitation and Quality of Care, 335 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 1227, 1228 (1996) (discussing the effect of managed care payments on health out-
comes); Randall S. Brown et al., Do Health Maintenance Organizations Work for Medicare?,
HEALTH CARE FINANCING REV., Fall 1993, at 7, 8 (1993) (examining the cost effect of Medi-
care's use of managed care); Robert Miller & Harold S. Luft, Managed Care Plan Performance
Since 1980: A Literature Analysis, 271 JAMA 1512, 1515 (1994) (examining the quality and
cost performance of managed care); Edward Yelin et al., Health Care Utilization and Outcomes
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in its early stages, but the empirical and practical analysis of con-
sumer-driven care is beginning to happen. 154 Even in advance of
substantial evidence, there is reason to be concerned about the fit
of consumer-driven health care to its goals in a way that differs sig-
nificantly from the case of managed care, casting considerable
doubt on the value of consumer-driven health care as a health re-
form vehicle.
What effect would the use of CDHPs by people with chronic ill-
ness have on the cost of and access to care? This is a question
different from that raised in the previous section, which reviewed
some of the literature on broad and complex questions of health
economics and policy. This section asks whether using the CDHPs
that are likely to be marketed will "work." By "likely to be mar-
keted," I mean those plans that I assume, based on the current
(limited) marketplace, legal structures, and lessons drawn from the
development of managed care, are likely to be adopted in the near
future. By asking whether consumer-driven care will "work," I ask
whether it is likely to reduce cost inflation without significantly
harming (in health status or financial security) a particular and
particularly vulnerable population: the chronically ill. I focus on
the chronically ill both because access to health care is obviously
very important to them, and because their care accounts for a large
proportion of national health costs. The inability of a proposed
health financing reform to deal adequately with the problems of
chronic illness should be regarded as prima facie evidence that it is
not ready for adoption. The basic, cost-driven form of CDHP is
likely to fail that test.
B. The Cost of Health Care for the Chronically Ill
Discussions of health finance reform tend to treat health care
costs as either homogeneous or randomly distributed.1 5 5 They are
neither. If health costs were homogeneously distributed, we
wouldn't need health insurance at all. Instead, we would budget
Among Persons With Rheumatoid Arthritis in Fee-for-Service and Prepaid Group Practice Settings, 276
JAMA 1048, 1050 (1996) (comparing quality data in managed care and fee-for-service set-
tings).
154. See Christianson et al., supra note 98, at 1123-24; Stephen T. Parente et al., Evalua-
tion of the Effect of a Consumer-Driven Health Plan on Medical Care Expenditures and Utilization, 39
HEALTH SERVICES RES. 1189, 1202-06 (2004); Lo Sasso et al., supra note 93, at 1079-80.
155. See 2004 COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISORs ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 198-
SPRING 2005]
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
for health costs as we do for other regular, predictable costs such as
food and shelter. And if health costs were randomly distributed-
that is, if the identity of persons in need of expensive care each
year were entirely unpredictable-then everyone would be an
equal risk for health insurance purposes, actuaries would be out of
ajob, and insurance premiums would be identical for all. The tasks
of cost containment and access expansion would not be easy, but
the application of uniform cost-containment strategies would stand
a chance of being effective and equitable.
The vital fact in this context, however, is that health care expen-
ditures are very concentrated, and a large and predictable part of
that concentrated cost is borne by the chronically ill and disabled.
The following chart demonstrates the unequal distribution of
health care costs in any given year."'
1996 HEALTH CARE EXPENDITURES BY PERCENTAGE
OF TOTAL U.S. POPULATION
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The distribution is terribly skewed. In any year, half the popula-
tion incurs almost no health care costs. The most expensive 10
percent of the population accounts for almost 70 percent of the
health care costs, and the top 2 percent accounts for almost 40
156. The data set for this graph is derived from a 2001 study by Berk and Monheit. Berk
& Monheit, supra note 13, at 12. See generally TIMOTHY STOLTZFUS JOST, DISENTITLEMENT?
THE THREATS FACING OUR PUBLIC HEALTH CARE PROGRAMS AND A RIGHT-BASED RESPONSE
9 (2003) (graphically depicting the skewed distribution of health care expenditures); Don-
ald W. Light, Commentary, Sociological Perspectives on Competition in Health Care, 25J. HEALTH
POL., POL'Y & L. 969, 972 (2000) (graphically depicting the skewed distribution of health
care expenditures).
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percent of the costs. 57 A small subset of the population, therefore,
accounts for almost all health expenditures in any year.'58
More significantly, the identity of this subpopulation is largely
knowable in advance: people with disabilities and chronic illnesses
have continuing, often expensive health care needs that drive a
large portion of national health expenditures. People with chronic
illness predictably need health care services and consume a large
percentage of health expenditures. Therefore, they are of central
concern in any attempts to contain health care costs or improve
access to health care services. Providing health care services to
people with chronic illnesses consumes about 75 percent of direct
health care costs. 9 The cost of care for a person with one chronic
condition is more than twice that of a person with only acute con-
ditions, ' 6 and almost six times more for a person with two or more
chronic conditions.
6
'
Studies that identify the medical conditions absorbing the high-
est medical expenditures support these data points. In one recent
study performed by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Qual-
ity, the authors, after detailing the fifteen most expensive medical
conditions, observed that, "[n]ot surprisingly, many of the most
expensive conditions were chronic diseases."6 2 And while several of
157. Berk & Monheit, supra note 13, at 12.
158. This skewing also is replicated in subpopulations. HEALTH CARE FINANCING RE-
vIEW, High Cost Users of Medicaid Services, 1996 MEDICARE & MEDICAID STAT. SUPPLEMENT 32
(1996) ("Medicare program spending is concentrated on a relatively small percentage of
enrollees with serious medical problems."); John M. Neff & Gerald Anderson, Protecting
Children with Chronic Illness in a Competitive Marketplace, 274 JAMA 1866, 1867 (1995) (finding
that 70 percent of Medicaid costs in Washington State were attributable to the medical
needs of 10 percent of participating children).
159. Hoffman et al., supra note 14, at 1476; see also CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND
PREVENTION, THE BURDEN OF CHRONIC DISEASES AND THEIR RISK FACTORS: NATIONAL AND
STATE PERSPECTIVES 3 (2002) (using the study in Hoffman et al., supra); Enthoven, supra
note 57, at W3-238 (citing Hoffman et al., supra). The Hoffman et al. study is now over 15
years old, and despite the importance of national health planning, no additional studies of
the cost of chronic care appear to have been undertaken since. Interview with Sean Cucchi,
Lead Public Health Analyst, National Center for Chronic Disease Prevention and Health
Promotion, Centers for Disease Control (Aug. 7, 2003) (on file with the University of Michi-
ganjournal of Law Reform) ("CDC is not aware of another more current study detailing the
costs of chronic conditions.").
160. Hoffman et al., supra note 14, at 1477.
161. Id.
162. Joel W. Cohen & Nancy A. Krauss, Spending and Service Use Among People with the Fif-
teen Most Costly Medical Conditions, 1997, HEALTH AFF., Mar.-Apr. 2003, at 129, 135. The
fifteen most expensive conditions were: heart disease, cancer, trauma, mental disorders,
pulmonary conditions, diabetes, hypertension, cerebrovascular disease, osteoarthritis,
pneumonia, back problems, endocrine disorders, skin disorders, kidney disease, and infec-
tious disease. Id. at 134; see also Benjamin G. Druss et al., Comparing the National Economic
Burden of Five Chronic Conditions, HEALTH AFF., Nov.-Dec. 2001, at 233, 235-36 (showing that
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the conditions were acute conditions, the authors emphasized that
even there, their "data make it clear that comorbidities, many of
which are likely to be chronic diseases, are a major factor in driving
health care spending and must be taken into account.1 63 A handful
of chronic conditions, then, account for a large proportion of
medical spending.
Chronic care's share of health spending appears to be increas-
ing. In a recent study, the increase in health spending between
1987 and 2000 was examined to determine which medical condi-
tions were predominant causes of the increase during that
period.'64 After adjusting data to control for double counting, the
authors estimated that just five medical conditions accounted for
31 percent of increased costs,165 and that fifteen conditions ac-
counted for 56 percent of increased costs.'66 Dominating both the
top five and top fifteen lists are conditions overwhelmingly chronic
in nature, such as heart disease, mental disorders, cancer, hyper-
tension, arthritis, and diabetes. 6 7 A combination of increased
prices for treatment and increases in a condition's prevalence led
to increased costs of treatment 6 8
Diabetes, a chronic condition and a consensus member of the
club of most expensive medical conditions, 1 9 is an example of a
condition giving rise to a host of concerns, both from a clinical and
cost perspective:
Diabetes mellitus is a chronic and potentially disabling disease
which represents a major public health and clinical concern.
People with the disease are at increased risk of developing
chronic complications related to ophthalmic, renal, neuro-
logical, cerebrovascular, cardiovascular, and peripheral
the cost of treatment of patients with one or more of five conditions--mood disorders, dia-
betes, heart disease, hypertension, and asthma-accounted for 49 percent of the nation's
health spending in 1996).
163. Cohen & Krauss, supra note 162, at 135.
164. Kenneth E. Thorpe et al., Which Medical Conditions Account For The Rise In Health
Care Spending?, HEALTH AFF. WEB EXCLUSIVE W4-437 (Aug. 25, 2004), at
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w4.437vl (on file with the University of
Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
165. Id. atW4-440 to W4-441. The five conditions were heart disease, pulmonary condi-
tions, mental disorders, cancer, and hypertension. Id.
166. Id. at W4-441. In addition to the top five, the other eleven conditions were trauma,
cerebrovascualar disease, arthritis, diabetes, back problems, skin disorders, pneumonia,
infectious disease, endocrine, and kidney conditions. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. See id.; Cohen & Krauss, supra note 162, at 134; Druss et al., supra note 162, at 236.
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vascular disease. Diabetics, for example, are more likely than
their non-diabetic peers to have heart attacks, strokes, ampu-
tations, kidney failure, and blindness. As a result of the
disease and its complications, people with diabetes have more
frequent and intensive encounters with the health care sys-
170tem.
The diabetic condition itself and the array of possible comorbid-
ities make diabetes an expensive condition. A recent study of"care
for a person with diabetes concluded that the cost of care was
$13,243 per year in 2002 dollars, more than five times the cost of
care for a person without diabetes.Y7 Even when the comparison is
adjusted to control for the higher-cost demographic profile of
people with diabetes, their care was almost two and one-half times
more expensive than those without diabetes. 7 2 And because their
chronic condition makes them so vulnerable to other serious dis-
eases, access to appropriate care is essential to protect the health
and quality of life of diabetics.
7 3
C. The Effects of Likely Versions of CDHPs
What does a description of chronic care have to do with con-
sumer-driven care? First, chronic care is expensive, and accounts
for a very high percentage of annual health costs. Second, chronic
conditions are ongoing, often permanent conditions, continuing
year to year, to the knowledge of the person with the condition. 4
These two factors must be accommodated in any discussion of the
value of consumer-driven care as a cost-containment device. Con-
sumers with chronic illness in CDHPs will know that they have
high-cost conditions that require frequent and expensive recourse
to health care services. And they all know it too: plan sponsors,
government architects of new tax-sheltered consumer-driven plans,
and health care providers. How will people with chronic illness
170. RobertJ. Rubin et al., Health Caye Expenditures for People with Diabetes Mellitus, 1992,
78J. CLINICAL ENDOCRINOLOGY & METABOLISM 809A, 809A (2004).
171. Paul Hogan et al., Economic Costs of Diabetes in the U.S. in 2002, 26 DIABETES CARE
917, 927 (2003).
172. Id.
173. Id. at 930-31; Rubin et al., supra note 170, at 809E.
174. TABER'S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICTIONARY 329 (5th ed. 1985) (defining "chronic"
as: "1. Of long duration. 2. Designating a disease showing little change or of slow progres-
sion. Opposite of acute.").
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fare? How will the health care finance system fare? These two ques-
tions are answered in turn.
1. Bad News for the Chronically Ill -The American health finance
system is in terrible shape. Eighty million people suffer at least six
months without insurance coverage each year,17 and the rate of
uninsurance is getting worse. v6 The high cost of coverage is un-
doubtedly a cause of the continuing crisis of uninsurance, and is
becoming a drag on the employment economy itself.' It is, there-
fore, imperative that some modifications be made to the health
finance system. But the risk of harm to the chronically ill caused by
reliance on CDHPs counsels against that move. The health needs
of those with significant chronic illnesses are so clearly predictable
that the structure of CDHPS can be viewed as simply assessing the
chronically ill an annual charge in the amount of the deductible
because they are chronically ill. Joseph Newhouse, in describing the
effect of cost sharing on the chronically ill, observed that "[p]aying
the initial cost sharing year after year may also be viewed as inequi-
table-that is, as a tax on the sick.' 7 8 This tax imposes two risks on
the chronically ill: negative health effects and impoverishment.
The high deductibles of CDHPs can cause negative health ef-
fects by creating barriers to coverage. These barriers are similar to
those examined in the RAND Health Insurance Experiment,
7 9
which studied the effect of per-visit co-payments. That study de-
termined that consumers faced with co-payments were as likely to
forego medically appropriate as inappropriate treatment. Disturb-
ingly, when co-payments were large or the consumers were poor,
these choices lead to worsened health outcomes.8 This bodes ill
for the effects of CDHPs on the chronically ill. Those with signifi-
cant chronic illnesses will likely be required to spend their own
funds each year to reach the high deductible insurance. This 100
percent effective co-payment for the substantial portion of cover-
age between HSA limits and insurance attachment may be at least
as likely to lead to refused care as the larger co-payments studied in
175. See FAMILIES USA, ONE IN THREE: NON-ELDERLY AMERICANS WITHOuT HEALTH IN-
SURANCE, 2002-2003, supra note 24, at 3.
176. See Leonhart, supra note 24, at Al.
177. See Paul Krugman, America's Failing Health, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2004, at A21
("[R]ising health care costs aren't just causing a rapid rise in the ranks of the uninsured ...
they're also, because of their link to employment, a major reason why this economic recov-
ery has generated fewer jobs than any previous economic expansion.").
178. See NEWHOUSE & INSURANCE EXPERIMENT GROUP, supra note 82, at 356 (suggesting
as a remedy the forgiveness or reduction of cost-sharing for the chronically ill).
179. Id.
180. Id.; see also HALL, supra note 82, at 48-49.
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the RAND experiment. CDHPs, then, pose a threat of causing re-
duced utilization of health services for the chronically ill. People
with serious diabetes, hypertension, cancer, heart disease, and
other chronic illnesses require frequent, coordinated care to main-
tain their health.18'
In addition to threatening those with chronic illness with in-
creased morbidity, consumer-driven care also threatens them with
impoverishment. Evidence from studies of bankruptcy filings sug-
gests that people with high medical debt-including those with
health insurance coverage-are disproportionately likely to be-
come impoverished and file for bankruptcy.8 2 The postal worker
plan described above permits substantial out-of-pocket costs' s3 A
member with individual coverage can incur $4500 per year in out-
of-pocket costs, and one with family coverage can incur $9000 per
year.18 4 In addition to the $9000 out-of-pocket "limit," members
must pay any amount charged by in-network or out-of-network
providers beyond the plan's usual and customary amount,'85 a 25
percent co-payment for pharmaceuticals, 8 6 and any penalties as-
sessed by the plan."8 As large as the out-of-pocket costs could be for
a chronically ill person insured by the postal worker plan, the
Medicare Modernization Act permits substantially larger costs. The
Act permits out-of-pocket maximums of $5000 for individual cov-
erage and $10,000 for family coverage,"" but (as is the case in the
postal plan) the maximum does not include anything beyond the
allowable in-network expenses. 8 9 A plan with a narrowly drawn
network or low allowable charges, then, could expose a person
with chronic illnesses to out-of-pocket expenses several times
higher than the purported "maximum."
181. See, e.g., Rubin et al., supra note 170, at 809E to 809F (stating that regular care for
diabetics reduces both the rates of medical complications and health care costs).
182. Jacoby et al., supra note 143, at 377 (stating that bankruptcy often follows large
medical debt).
183. See discussion supra Part II.A.3.
184. APWUHP BROCHURE, supra note 93, at 19.
185. Id. at 19, 53.
186. Id. at 19, 73.
187. Id. at 13-19 (listing penalties ranging from $100-500 for failure to obtain precerti-
fication for radiological services or inpatient hospital care, even prior to the attachment of
the traditional insurance plan, and not chargeable against the out-of-pocket maximum).
188. Medicare Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 108-173, sec. 1201, § 223(a), 117 Stat.
2066, 2469 (2003).
189. See Notice 2004-2, 2004-2 I.R.B. 269 ("[A] plan does not fail to [qualify for favor-
able tax treatment under Title XII of the Medicare Modernization Act] solely because the
out-of-pocket expense limits for services provided outside of the network exceeds [sic] the
maximum annual out-of-pocket expense limits allowed for a [high deductible health plan
under the Act].").
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People with chronic illness not only risk much in CDHPs, but
they gain little for two reasons. First, despite the freedom of choice
rhetoric surrounding consumer-driven care, people with chronic
illness may gain little ability to choose health care providers not
selected by their plan sponsors. When they reach the high-
deductible plan, they are subject to the utilization rules as they
would be under a traditional insurance program. Before that time,
when they are either spending from their HSA or paying their ad-
ditional out-of-pocket deductible, they may choose their provider.
For chronically ill people on the upper end of the health care utili-
zation graph,9 ° however, that window of free choice could be but a
portion of expected care for any year. And, unless the member
wishes to change providers mid-year, the "free" choice of a provider
early in the year could lead to substantial out-of-network payments
(out of pocket) later in the year.
The freedom of choice even within the consumer-controlled
portion of the plan may be subject to a further check. Many con-
sumer-directed plans aid consumers in making cost-conscious
selections through internet-based information tools.'91 However,
consumer ability and willingness to price-compare physicians and
other providers through internet tools has been quesioned. 92 In
addition, while members can often access participating providers
for the plan's discount price even before they reach the attach-
ment point of the high-deductible insurance,' 93 out-of-network
providers are likely to be more expensive, and as described above,
the excess costs of out-of-network providers may not be chargeable
against annual out-of-pocket maximums.' The combination of
these financial incentives to stay in-network approximates the pres-
sures of traditional insurance.
The second reason the chronically ill have little to gain from
consumer-driven care is simpler and more obvious. The major fi-
nancial inducement offered by CDHPs is the chance to gain
ownership of HSA funds over time; the Medicare Modernization
190. See graph supra Part III. B.
191. See Gabel et al., supra note 2, at W397 to W399 (explaining that cost containment
would be achieved when members shop for providers by comparing prices online).
192. See Christianson et al., supra note 98, at 1125, 1164 (noting that more research is
needed to determine whether consumers are able to make informed decisions on medical
care);Jon Gabel et al., Employers' Contradictory Views About Consumer-Driven Health Care: Results
From A National Survey, HEALTH An'. WEB EXCLUSIVE W4-210, W4-218 n.2 (Apr. 21, 2004), at
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w4.210vl (on file with the University of
Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
193. See APWUHP BROCHURE, supra note 93, at 52.
194. See supra Part II.A.3.
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Act even permits rolled-over HSA funds to be used as a retirement
account.' 95 But people with significant chronic illnesses-those to
the right on the health care utilization graph-will likely use up
the amounts in their HSAs every year and therefore enjoy no fi-
nancial "ownership" benefit from a consumer-driven plan.96
Other financial benefits are possible in the abstract. If CDHPs
were substantially more effective at reducing the rate of health care
inflation, all members would, or could, benefit from that efficiency
in the form of higher wages or lower cost-sharing. The next section
argues, however, that such cost savings are unlikely.
In sum, there is little the chronically ill could look forward to in
the most likely form of consumer-driven health care. The lure of
taking ownership of their HSA funds is unavailable, as they will,
and know they will, spend all of the funds in their accounts all or
most years on predictable, necessary, and expensive care. Their
CDHPs will protect them from out-of-pocket costs no more than
any other form of health coverage. If the move to consumer-
directed plans largely does not affect health costs, as I argue be-
low,197 then the obvious cost-saving lever for sponsors is to increase
employee cost-sharing,9 8 and it is the chronically ill who suffer
from that move.
2. Bad News for Plan Sponsors--A movement to consumer-driven
care, as that movement is emerging in the marketplace, is likely to
present significant dangers for people with serious chronic illness.
The plans that emerge are likely to be focused on short-term cost-
savings, not on addressing the effectiveness and efficiency of care
for those with serious health needs. 9 A second flaw in emerging
consumer-driven plans is normatively independent of this problem,
although conceptually linked. Consumer-driven plans that are
emerging and are likely to emerge, shaped by recent legislation
and regulatory guidance, will not serve sponsors' main goal-
reducing health inflation-because the spending patterns of
195. Medicare Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 108-173, sec. 1201, § 223(a), 117 Stat.
2066, 2469 (2003).
196. See graph 1 supra Part III.B. The same problem will plague those with acute ill-
nesses. See George C. Halvorson, Commentary-Current MSA Theory: Well-Meaning but Futile, 39
HEALTH SERVICES REs. 1119, 1120-21 (2004) (arguing that people with acute illnesses will
not be guided by incentives to preserve spending pool funding because the cost of their care
overwhelms those amounts).
197. See infra Part III.C.2.
198. See Gabel et al., supra note 21, at 119-20 (describing the increases in coinsurance
and co-payments as other cost-containment moves have failed); Robinson, supra note 67, at
W140 (describing recent trends in expanded member cost-sharing).
199. See supra Part II.A.
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members are so skewed. They are likely to fail because, as hap-
pened with managed care, the interesting, nuanced, theoretical
constructions of consumer-driven care will give way to simple plans
that are easy to market and manage, and that implement a
stripped-down version of a new health plan model. Marketed con-
sumer-driven care is likely to adopt the portions of the theory that
turn over to consumers the authority and responsibility for spend-
ing decisions. It is likely to miss, however, the theorists' emphasis
on the need to focus on the extremely wide range in needs among
consumers-from the many who need little care other than rou-
tine examinations to the few who need the lion's share of attention
and spending. The likely result are plans designed as though con-
vincing the 50 percent of Americans who account for 3 percent of
health costs to be careful shoppers is an accomplishment to trum-
pet to benefits managers. Focusing on the easy parts of a problem
does not solve a crisis; doing so wastes money. We are not likely to
see Herzlinger's vision of a health system that focuses on improving
care for the chronically ill any time soon,0 ° or Porter and Teis-
berg's vision of health plans being rewarded for seeking out and
serving people with serious illness, instead of gaining by shedding
any member who might become ill.20 Would these subtle, complex
visions of consumer-driven care work? We cannot learn the answer
to this question from the performance of simple CDHPs anymore
than we can judge the richness of Enthoven's, Ellwood's, and
Havighurst's visions for managed care and managed competition
from U.S. health care's HMO performance. The market that
adopted a cartoon of managed competition appears poised to
adopt a cartoon of consumer-driven care.
Professor Herzlinger's recent compilation of essays on con-
sumer-driven care emphasizes a controversial reorientation of
health finance, from expert to consumer control of spending.0 2
But Herzlinger and her contributors simultaneously acknowledge
the need for any sensible health finance system (if it is to contain
cost and provide quality care) to emphasize excellent and readily
available care for the chronically and acutely ill.20 3 Instead, recent
200. See CONSUMER-DRIVEN HEALTH CARE, supra note 7, at 118-21 (describing the need
to focus on caring for the chronically ill).
201. SeePorter & Teisberg, supra note 74, at 72.
202. See CONSUMER-DRIVEN HEALTH CARE, supra note 7, at xvii ("[C]onsumer-driven
care is a revolution-a radical turn away from the technocratic, top-down policies that just
say no to providers and consumers both in the United States and abroad.").
203. See, e.g., Al Lewis, Consumer-Driven Health Care for the Chronically Ml4 in CONSUMER-
DRIVEN HEALTH CARE: IMPLICATIONS FOR PROVIDERS, PAYERS, AND POLICYMAKERS 589 (Re-
gina Herzlinger ed., 2004); Robert E. Stone, Improving Health and Reducing the Costs of Chronic
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legislative 20 and regulatory 2 5 actions facilitate the proliferation of
simple CDHPs focused on shifting purchasing decisions to con-
sumers instead of on rationalizing and improving care to those
who actually use health care services in an ongoing intensive fash-
ion. It is no accident, then, that the early CDHPs are long on
transferring responsibility and power to consumers, and short on
improving the care of people with chronic illness. 2°5
Opportunities will be missed as the market responds to the sim-
ple, short-term, cost-cutting aspects of plan design and avoids the
complex, long term, and truly innovative aspects of consumer-
driven care. But more must be said. This selective adoption of the
consumer-driven model does more than omit possibly positive
changes; it spells the loss of any opportunity to control costs, unless
the massive shifting of costs from sponsors to members is regarded
as a form of legitimate cost control. And this failure of real cost-
savings can be demonstrated without reference to one of the most
discussed areas of cost concern for consumer-driven plans: the
danger that they will splinter sponsors' risk pools, skimming the
young and well while leaving the older and sicker to traditional
207coverage. There is little evidence as of yet on risk selection, and
what evidence exists is somewhat mixed.20 Even leaving aside the
problem of adverse risk selection, CDHPs are unlikely to save spon-
sors money. That is, costs are likely to go up even if all members
move to a consumer-directed plan.
Diseases, in CONSUMER-DRIVEN HEALTH CARE: IMPLICATIONS FOR PROVIDERS, PAYERS, AND
POLIcYmAERs 643 (Regina Herzlinger ed., 2004).
204. See Medicare Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 108-173, sec. 1201, § 223(a), 117 Stat.
2066, 2469 (2003).
205. SeeTreas. Notice 2004-2, supra note 189.
206. See Lo Sasso et al., supra note 93, at 1074, 1078 (describing plans with an emphasis
on shifting responsibility to consumers); Parente et al., supra note 93, at 1095 (same).
207. SeeJefferson, supra note 134, at 713-14 (observing that adding consumer-driven
plans may cause an increase in the cost of remaining, more traditional plans); Dwight
McNeill, Do Consumer-Directed Health Benefits Favor the Young and Healthy?, HEALTH AFF., Jan.-
Feb. 2004, at 186, 191 (demonstrating through simulation that the young and healthy bene-
fit from consumer-directed plans); Laura A. Tollen et al., Risk Segmentation Related to the
Offering of a Consumer-Directed Health Plan: A Case Study of Humana Inc., 39 HEALTH SERVICES
RES. 1167, 1183 (2004) (finding evidence of risk selection with lower-cost members choosing
CDHPs and noting contrary suggestions in other studies); Gabel et al., supra note 2, at W403
(reporting concerns that the young and healthy will select CDHPs and drive up THE costs of
traditional plans).
208. See Jinnet Briggs Fowles et al., Early Experience with Employee Choice of Consumer-
Directed Health Plans and Satisfaction with Enrollment, 39 HEALTH SERVICES RES. 1141, 1146
(2004) (finding some selection bias); Parente et al., supra note 93, at 1203 (finding little
evidence of selection bias); Tollen et al., supra note 207, at 1183 (finding some selection
bias); Gabel et al., supra note 2, at W403 to W404 (observing that evidence either way is
thin).
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Consider how consumer-driven care will affect spending for
those on the upper end of the consumption curve-the 10 percent
accounting for 70 percent of the cost. Those with severe acute and
chronic illnesses will incur costs that dwarf their HSA contribution
and deductible.2 09 Despite the savings gained by transferring these
initial costs to the sickest members, sponsors gain no cost-saving
value from HSAs for the lion's share of annual health expendi-
tures.
Sponsors are unlikely to achieve cost-savings from low-cost
members either. Low-cost consumers possibly will regard the HSAs
as first-dollar coverage for their rare and inexpensive needs, loos-
ening any inhibitions they may have had with respect to such
expenditures. As they "roll over" their annual unspent HSA
amounts, they are free even from contributing -their own deducti-
ble amounts should they need some care-for a broken leg
suffered while skiing, for example. One team of researchers de-
scribed this problem:
[I]f the employer contributes 50 percent of the deductible
each year to the account, employees who use only preventive
services could bank two years of spending account dollars to
reach first-dollar coverage by year three. In this case, employ-
ees who never exceed their annual personal care account ...
allocations from year three forward could have first dollar
coverage up to two million dollars for a lifetime, indefi-
nitely.
2 10
Whether low-cost consumers will react in this fashion or not is
not yet predictable. It is clear, however, that, at a minimum, spon-
sors will be diverting the funding required for HSA contributions
each year to this low-spending cohort.21' If an employer adopts a
plan like the Postal plan for all employees, it will be devoting $1000
per year to an HSA for all members, including 50 percent of the
workers who need almost no health care in the year. Those are
funds that otherwise could be devoted to paying for care of high-
cost members. Employers, then, will gain no inhibitory effect on
209. See discussion supra Part III.C.1.
210. Parente et al., supra note 154, at 1193 (noting that this consumer reaction is con-
jecture in the absence of real world experience with sufficient consumers in CDHPs).
211. See Gabel et al., supra note 2, at W403 ("[Y]oung, healthy people who previously
received no payments for medical claims expenses will now receive an annual payment for
their [HSA], and these payments will be offset by reductions in payments to sicker people,
who use up their allotment.").
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spending for the high-cost members, and will likely be increasing
spending for low-cost members.
An in-between group of members may react to the ownership
incentives as sponsors wish. These members would have no expen-
sive acute or chronic conditions, the obvious high costs of which
would clearly signal to the member that his HSA contributions and
deductibles will be spoken for immediately. And they would not be
in the majority of members who spend almost nothing each year.
They must be members with expenses substantial enough to be
regarded by the member as significant, but minor enough to make
careful shopping worthwhile. For example, families with children
likely to suffer minor traumas or childhood illnesses, and people
with mild forms of chronic illness such as arthritis or well-
controlled behavioral disorders, could expect to incur substantial
medical costs each year, but perhaps less than the attachment point
of the high-deductible insurance. However, this seems an odd slice
of the risk pool to drive revolutionary changes in plan design.
Early experience and regulatory guidance suggest that the mar-
ket will produce a form of consumer-directed health care not
focused on centers of excellence and management of chronic and
other high-cost care. Instead, it is likely to focus on the power of
consumer responsibility to lessen health cost inflation. Such plans,
however, are likely to disadvantage people with chronic illness, a
vulnerable population reliant on access to appropriate health care.
In addition, they are likely to misfire in their attempt to contain
costs. Sponsors might adopt a far-sighted perspective and invest in
the research, technology, and network building to permit the
health finance system to reward quality and results instead of short-
term cost savings. Sponsors faced the same choice in the managed
care era and proved shortsighted. Is there any reason to believe the
market-driven result will be different this time?
IV. NEXT STEPS
A. Market Adjustments
Consumer-driven care does not necessarily lead to these bad re-
sults for the chronically ill. The failure to recognize and account
for the concentration of health costs could doom consumer-driven
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care.2 1 2 But sponsors of health care have substantial tools available
to protect the chronically ill while reducing cost.
First, sponsors can create "focused factories" of health care-
centers that gather expertise in particular procedures, and that are
geared to serve the particular needs of people with serious chronic
and acute medical conditions.2 3 These centers improve care for
the sickest people by reliably providing access to the best physi-
cians and procedures. They save money by providing intensive and
chronic care in a coordinated manner, eliminating or reducing the
waste that occurs when care is fragmented, such as discontinuous,
214
redundant, or inconsistent care.
This vision of health reform conflicts with America's finance sys-
tem, which is dominated by employer sponsorship of coverage
provided by for-profit health insurance firms. Insurers and spon-
sors have well-understood incentives to resist becoming excellent at
treating the sick, as the sick are expensive, even with excellent co-
ordination of care. It is easier and more profitable to avoid the
costly patient than to cover them. The advocates of a sophisticated
vision of market-driven care recognize this tension; they recognize
that our current finance system cannot provide incentives for in-
surers to become magnets for sick people. To the contrary, our
current system pays for the care of the sickest members of society
in a way that insufficiently recognizes the extreme concentration of
costs in the health delivery system.
As a second step in incorporating this concentration of costs
into consumer-driven care, commentators propose systems of risk
adjustment in which plans receive payment commensurate with the
needs of each member."5 Plans then would have incentives to pro-
vide excellent care, sponsors would reap the benefits of more
efficient delivery of care to people with acute and chronic condi-
tions, and patients would benefit from higher-quality and better-
coordinated care.21 6 These descriptions are clear-eyed, hardheaded,
212. See CONSUMER-DRIVEN HEALTH CARE, supra note 7; Robinson, supra note 90, at
1885.
213. See CONSUMER-DRIVEN HEALTH CARE, supra note 7, at 105-11;Jody Hoffner Gitell,
Achieving Focus in Hospital Care The Role of Relational Coordination, in CONSUMER-DRIVEN
HEALTH CARE: IMPLICATIONS FOR PROVIDERS, PAYERS, AND POLICYMAKERS 683, 689-90 (Re-
gina Herzlinger ed., 2004) (noting that expert facilities improve care and reduce costs by
improving skill and experience levels and the coordination of care); Porter & Teisberg,
supra note 74, at 74-75.
214. SeeGitell, supra note 214, at 690-92.
215. See CONSUMER-DRIVEN HEALTH CARE, supra note 7, at 80--83.
216. See CONSUMER-DRIVEN HEALTH CARE, supra note 7, at 79-80; Ann L. Robinson, The
Buyers Health Care Action Group, in CONSUMER-DRIVEN HEALTH CARE: IMPLICATIONS FOR
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and smart responses to difficult problems bedeviling our health
finance system. The intelligence and cogency of these discussions,
however, should not give us comfort that the emerging consumer-
driven health care revolution will succeed, for several reasons.
First, the descriptions of how to create nationwide "focused fac-
tories" and implement effective risk adjustments are either vague
21
or dependent on isolated, small-scale anecdotes.17 The vagueness
contrasts with the crystal-clear description of simple CDHPs that
shift responsibility to consumers, ignore the extreme concentra-
tion of costs, and are geared to cost containment rather than
quality. Second, "focused factories" and risk adjustments are not
new. They were central to, of all things, the Clinton health plan-
not the model fastened on to by the consumer-driven care move-
ment.218 The importance of what used to be called "centers of
excellence" and risk adjustment has been well recognized during
the entirety of managed care's dominance, and very little progress
in implementing either has been made. The lack of progress can
be attributed to the failure of managed care to live up to its theo-
retical promise when the marketplace's demands for immediate
cost-control came to dominate plan design.2 1 9 Consumer-driven
health care appears to be off on the same trajectory. Theorists as-
sert that the consumer-driven movement can rationalize a system
that fails to provide incentives to efficiently and effectively care for
the small minority of consumers who need extensive care.2 In-
stead, emerging plans appeal to sponsors who either are confused
and believe that costs are smoothly spread among members, or are
cynically interested in shifting costs to members under the cover of
consumer-friendly reform. Sound familiar? Remember managed
care?
As managed care took hold in the 1990s, concerns that cost-
containment efforts overbalanced patient care concerns produced
a wave of regulation.2 2 ' The move to regulate the free-wheeling
managed care industry did not save it, whether because managed
PROVIDERS, PAYERS, AND POLICYMAKERS 309, 312 (Regina Herzlinger ed., 2004) (describing
private rsk adjustment).
217. See CONSUMER-DRIVEN HEALTH CARE, supra note 7, at 107-11; Porter & Teisberg,
supra note 74, at 67.
218. SeeJoseph P. Newhouse, Patients at Risk: Health Reform and Risk Adjustment, HEALTH
Ast., Spring 1994, at 132, 139-41 (1994) (discussing risk adjustment in the Clinton health
plan); Walter Zelman, The Rationale Behind the Clinton Health Care Reform Plan, HEALTH AF.,
Spring 1994, at 9, 21 (discussing the value-purchasing aspect of the Clinton health plan).
219. See supra Part I.B.
220. CONSUMER-DRIVEN HEALTH CARE, supra note 7, at 79-80.
221. SeeJacobson, supra note 29, at 381-83.
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care plans had lost trust with consumers, the regulation was poorly
done, or the regulatory impulse was inconsistent with the market
forces that had given rise to managed care.Y Perhaps the gulf be-
tween the richness of consumer-driven theory and the apparent
simple-mindedness of the market can be bridged with consumer-
driven health care. The next section will examine the likelihood
that regulation consistent with the need for attention to chronic
illness can turn the movement away from the myopic view towards
simplistic and short-term cost-saving goals that doomed managed
care.
B. Regulatory Adjustments
The market appears poised to fail in shaping consumer-directed
care. Can regulatory intervention help? This is a difficult task,
given the generally anti-regulatory orientation of consumer-
directed programs. One possibility is to recognize that subjecting
some forms of care to generally applicable, high deductibles is
counterproductive. If the routine care needed by people with
chronic illness is recognized as medically necessary; the quantum
of care needed by those with chronic illness is large enough that
the deductibles will not serve as an effective check on excess
spending; and access to routine care (e.g., outpatient care for chil-
dren with asthma) is cost-effective in preventing hospitalizations,
then some routine care should be covered under first-dollar cover-
age. Such an adjustment fine-tunes the rather crude incentive
systems of emerging CDHPs, leaving substantial consumer respon-
sibility for elective spending, but encouraging and paying for care
essential to maintaining the health and functioning of people with
significant chronic illnesses.
The Medicare Modernization Act's treatment of consumer-
driven care opens a door to just such a possibility. CDHPs can
maintain their tax-favored status, notwithstanding general re-
quirements for high-deductible insurance under the Act, if they
provide first-dollar or low deductible coverage for preventive
care."' This exception recognizes the value of primary care as a
means of keeping people well, catching illness early, and prevent-
222. See Jacobson, supra note 29, at 381-83; David A. Hyman, Regulating Managed Care:
What's Wrong With a Patient Bill of Rights ?, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 221, 248-53 (2000).
223. Medicare Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 108-173, sec. 1201, § 223(a), 117 Stat.
2066, 2469 (2003).
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ing more serious (and more expensive) illnesses down the road.
The Act's waiver of high deductibles in primary care coverage en-
courages members to use preventive care even at the expense of
careful shopping in health care consumption. The Treasury has
interpreted this exception very narrowly, however, limiting "pre-
ventive care benefits" almost entirely to screening and diagnostic
procedures, and prohibiting first dollar from being used for rou-
tine treatment of existing medical conditions. 4 This pinched
interpretation clearly missed an opportunity to address a central
difficulty in consumer-driven care.
A second possibility is to prescribe what deductible amount is
permissible for the chronically ill, instead of prescribing what types
of spending must be subject to deductibles. Such regulation is jus-
tified on both public policy and financial grounds. As described
above, a discrete population of chronically ill in the risk pool goes
through their deductible amount each year on spending for pre-
dictable, expensive, and medically necessary care-unless, of
course, they forego such care.2  Requiring this cohort to go
through the exercise each year of spending through their deducti-
ble amount is nothing more than a tax on the sick-a transfer of
cost from sponsors and the general insured pool to the chronically
ill.226 Requiring that deductibles for the chronically ill be waived
will not impair careful shopping. The chronically ill, knowing they
will spend their HSA contribution and deductible amounts each
year, have no opportunity to feel "ownership" of these funds; in-
stead, they see the expenditures as painful and expensive rituals
required to gain access to insurance coverage. For the same rea-
sons, the sponsors will not experience reduced health costs by
imposing deductibles on the chronically ill except for the cost-shift
of the amount of the deductible. The mandatory waiving of de-
ductibles is a relatively easy form of risk adjustment that resolves
some of the problems of people with chronic illness.2 7
224. See Notice 2004-23, 2004-14 I.R.B. 725 (specifying that "preventive care" for CDHP
purposes is limited to periodic health examinations, routine prenatal and well-child care,
immunizations, tobacco cessation programs, weight-loss programs, and screening and diag-
nostic services, but not treatment for previously diagnosed illnesses).
225. See discussion supra Part III.C.1.
226. NEWHOUSE & INSURANCE EXPERIMENT GROUP, supra note 82, at 356.
227. Similar regulatory measures could be applied to high out-of-pocket minimums for
people with disabilities. See Medicare Modernization Act § 223(a) (describing out-of-pocket
deductible limits that are only minimums, where sponsors are free to be more generous); see
also supra Part I.A (discussing the high out-of-pocket limits likely to be attached to high-
deductible insurance).
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State regulation along these lines is clearly permissible. The
Medicare Modernization Act permits CDHPs to have deductibles
equal to the amount paid into the HSA, and requiring such protec-
tions for the chronically ill therefore would not impair the favored
tax status of a plan.2 Notwithstanding the otherwise broad pre-
emption of employee welfare plans, regulation of insurance is
firmly within the ambit of state governments.
22 9
There are two potential problems with this plan. First, there is
tension between the rhetoric of consumer-directed care as empow-
ering consumers to make spending choices-not the state, sponsor,
or plan-and the imposition of mandates on sponsors of CDHPs.
This tension reflects the genuine complexity of health finance re-
form, instead of serving as a refutation of regulation. The second
concern is much more troubling. ERISA only protects state regula-
tion of insured coverage, and many sponsors avoid state regulation
by self-insuring. 230 There is no reason to believe self-insurance will
be any less frequent with high-deductible coverage, particularly if
states aggressively regulate it, thereby potentially limiting the im-
pact of regulation.
Thirdly, in addition to looking to the coverage and attachment
points of high deductible insurance, regulators could look to HSAs
themselves to protect people with chronic illness. The HSA en-
courages members to be careful consumers by imparting a sense of
ownership over the funds, and it softens the impact of the high de-
ductible component of the insurance coverage.22' The first function
does not apply to people with serious chronic illness, as they know
they will run through their HSA funding each year and will not
have the opportunity to form any attachment to the funds.2 3 HSAs
do serve the second function for the chronically ill, softening the
blow of high deductible amounts; as described above, however, any
substantial deductible beyond the HSA amount is an intolerable
tax on the sick.233
As a fourth possibility, states could require sponsors to close the
gap between the spending account and the high-deductible health
plan for people with chronic illness by adjusting the annual contri-
228. Medicare Modernization Act § 223(a).
229. See Kentucky Ass'n of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller, 538 U.S. 329, 337-39 (2003) (in-
terpreting ERISA's insurance savings clause broadly); Metro. Life v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S.
724, 741-43 (1985) (same).
230. Metro. Life, 471 U.S. at 758 (holding that the insurance savings clause does not
permit states to regulate self-funded plans).
231. See supra Part II.A.1.
232. See supra Part III.C.1.
233. Id.
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bution. In effect, this is a form of risk adjustment. Sponsors are re-
quired to adjust up the amount of the HSA contribution to equal
the deductible of the residual insurance, but only for people with
chronic medical conditions that will cause them to meet the de-
ductible year in and year out. This functionally regulates the
residual insurance to. minimize the out-of-pocket amount for the
chronically ill, with one major difference. ERISA empowers states
to regulate the insured, but not the self-insured plans, 34 splitting
the marketplace and permitting different treatment of those who
purchase insurance (usually smaller employers) and those who self-
insure (usually larger employers). Such regulation would avoid a
split with the regulation of HSAs, giving states uniform jurisdiction
over all sponsors providing consumer-directed coverage.
ERISA should not preempt permissible state regulation. Al-
though ERISA generally preempts state regulation of employee
welfare benefit plans,235 and programs created to provide employ-
ees "benefits in the event of sickness" are generally construed as
welfare plans,3 6 the United States Department of Labor recently
advised that it will not treat HSAs as employee welfare benefit
plans.2 7 If the Labor advice holds up, states will be free to regulate
HSAs without concern of ERISA preemption and could require
contribution adjustments depending on the chronic-condition
status of employees.M
If ERISA does not preempt state regulation, the comprehen-
siveness of the regulation could create several concerns. First, and
most obviously, CDHPs arose in part due to dissatisfaction with the
highly regulated health coverage environment. The market's fail-
ure to account adequately for the chronically ill blunts this
criticism, but the regulation could be sufficiently discordant in this
context to render it too unpopular to be viable. Less obviously, but
more significantly, risk adjustment methods are less effective and
more dangerous when applied in retail fashion-that is, when an
employer must adjust upward payments for the benefit of an iden-
tified employee. While federal law protects such an employee from
234. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b) (2) (B) (2000); Metro. Life, 471 U.S. at 741-43.
235. 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (2000).
236. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (2000).
237. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, FIELD ASSISTANCE BULLETIN 2004-1
(2004), available at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/regs/fab_2004-1.html (on file with the Univer-
sity of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) (advising that Health Savings Accounts are not
"employee welfare benefit plans" within the regulatory domain of the Department of La-
bor).
238. See id. at n.7 ("HSAs are personal health care savings vehicles rather than a form of
group health insurance.").
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disparate employment treatment because she creates higher costs
for her employer,239 such a move creates dangerous incentives for
employers.
Ultimately, several regulatory tools are available to address the
likely failure of the consumer-directed market to account for the
needs of people with chronic illness. They require an adjustment
in sponsors' perception that consumer-directed health care will be
free from extensive government regulation, and the new health
coverage setting requires the development of new regulatory
methods.
C. The Convergence of Plan Design and Financing Reform
Perhaps the problem with consumer-directed health care is not
the likelihood of going too far, but the likelihood of not going far
enough. The effects of CDHPs on the chronically ill jar us; they
seem an affront to the social pooling purposes of health insurance.
On the other hand, why shouldn't some health costs-those rea-
sonably predictable and within a person's ability to plan-be
segmented from those that are unusual, large, or beyond a per-
son's ability to plan? The consumer-driven plans produced by the
cost-conscious marketplace are good at segmenting health costs.
That segmentation has considerable appeal. But the plans founder
on their inability, or unwillingness, to take into account social eq-
uity-the unfairness of imposing on individuals costs of medically
necessary health care that are beyond their means.
Advocates of consumer-driven care use retirement planning as a
useful analogy. Americans have become relatively comfortable with
the 401 (k) as a vehicle for retirement funding-why not have con-
sumer control and direction for health care as well? This analogy
should be pushed a bit. One problem is that health finance is so
much more complex than retirement finance. Retirement needs
are relatively uniform-food, shelter, and clothing-and therefore
simple actuarial analysis can manage the basics for large popula-
239. See 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (2000) (prohibiting disparate treatment against employees
"for the purpose of interfering with the attainment of any right" under an employee welfare
plan under ERISA); 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2000) (prohibiting disparate treatment in the
terms and conditions of employment by reason of disability under the ADA). But see Toyota
Motor Mfg. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002) (narrowly construing "disability" for coverage by
the ADA); McGann v. H & H Music Co., 946 E 2d 401 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied sub nora.
Greenberg v. H & H Music Co., 506 U.S. 981 (1992) (narrowly construing the protections
granted by ERISA).
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tions. Another problem is that through Social Security, the gov-
ernment has planned a large chunk of retirement for seventy years,
and (most) Americans are perfectly happy to leave it as a govern-
ment task. Upon retiring, all Americans receive a basic level of
income support that varies only slightly based on their levels of
payment into the Social Security system (and in the case of people
who have not worked on the books, on the basis of need). Em-
ployment-based, defined-contribution retirement 401 (k) plans are
private supplements to the government base-something less than
a luxury, more than an absolute necessity.
High-deductible health insurance, on the other hand, is essen-
tial to any form of health insurance. It is difficult to describe a
person as having "health insurance" if she does not have "catastro-
phic coverage" for unexpected, large, medically necessary care.
Protection from medical catastrophe is not a controversial part of
financial health planning, just as basic Social Security income
benefits are not a controversial part of retirement planning. The
former protects people from becoming impoverished or unable to
afford necessary medical care, and the latter protects people from
the possibility of becoming impoverished or unable to afford the
bare essentials of survival upon retirement.
The controversial aspect of health care is the funding of sub-
catastrophic coverage-the deductible. This is not a problem in
retirement planning because retirement planning is simpler. We
do not worry that market distortions will impact spending for basic
food, shelter, and clothing, and thereby require complex means to
guard against the overstatement of costs. The costs of basic food,
shelter, and clothing are easily ascertained, even if the political will
to provide the full costs are sometimes lacking. With health financ-
ing, two competing forms of discomfort confront us. On one hand,
we lack confidence in our ability to ascertain when care is medi-
cally necessary-contrast with deciding whether food is necessary
for a retiree-so we are inclined to impose a market discipline on
providers and consumers incentivizing them to make wise,
thoughtful decisions. On the other hand, we are uncomfortable
with the imposition of barriers to care when a person has a serious
chronic condition that demands predictable, expensive, and medi-
cally necessary services. In that case, we are inclined not to leave
the patient to the vagaries of a loosely functioning market disci-
pline. Instead, we want the person's care to be well-managed-with
her input-both to prevent her from suffering needless pain, mor-
bidity, or premature death, and to prevent her necessarily
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expensive medical condition from absorbing excess unnecessary
cost.
The consumer-driven plans emerging in the marketplace, en-
abled and encouraged by Title XII of the Medicare Modernization
Act and IRS guidance, can form a framework for progress, flawed
though they are in their shortsighted present form. The segmenta-
tion at the heart of these consumer-driven plans could signal a
revolution not merely in health plan structure but in health fi-
nance-the allocation of costs and responsibilities for American
health care. The government collects and disburses funds for the
basics of retirement funding, and with the assistance of employers
and encouragement of the tax system, for substantial supplemental
funding for retirement planning. With the added complexity nec-
essary to configure financing for health care, the allocation could
be similar.
Two related points converge between the theory of consumer-
driven care and the theory of managed care or managed competi-
tion. Both points are important to the theorists of the respective
systems; the refusal to grapple in a serious way with either point
contributed to the failure of managed care, and will contribute to
the failure of consumer-directed care. First, the great concentra-
tion of health expenditures in care for the chronically ill requires
"centers of excellence" expert in high-cost care. Theorists of both
systems recognize that providing excellent services to people with
serious health conditions is necessary both to achieve high-quality
care and to address cost concerns where most costs reside.240 Sec-
ond, the American health finance market currently is ill suited to
foster "centers of excellence." Health plans compete on price, and
avoiding high-cost members is the easiest and surest way to achieve
low prices. Employers and other sponsors can counter this com-
petitive effect by demanding that plans focus on both low-cost and
high-cost members, as sponsors are responsible for both. But spon-
sors have not demanded this because they over-select for price
when picking a plan-in part out of shortsightedness, in part be-
cause they have no desire to become the employer of choice for
high-cost employees, and in part because the quality measures that
would justify higher prices are under-developed.24'
240. See CONSUMER-DRIVEN HEALTH CARE, supra note 7, at 105-11 (discussing the im-
portance of using "focused factories" of health care for expensive conditions); Zelman, supra
note 218, at 21 (discussing the "value purchasing" aspect of the Clinton health program).
241. Jacobson, supra note 29, at 376-81 (describing agency problems arising from em-
ployer purchase of coverage).
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These points require some structural form of risk adjustment. 42
Sharing the cost of the small number of high-cost members among
sponsors allows them to focus on locating excellent, efficient care.
And if sponsors demand excellent, efficient care, then plans (how-
ever configured) can compete for business by generating "centers
of excellence." The concentration of cost in a few patients impels
the creation of "centers of excellence," yet the economic condi-
tions for their creation are not present unless some mechanism
adjusts the burden of paying for them among sponsors.
How do we get there? Government is the obvious agent for risk
spreading. First, pooling risk to create equitable access to necessary
care seems a proper government function. Second, a substantial
common action problem inheres in dealing with high-cost medical
risks. Using the government as an agent of risk adjustment aggre-
gates the risks under one umbrella and allows for the allocation of
funds on the basis of quality and efficiency without the blocking
point of disparate sponsors' competing financial concerns.2 43 De-
spite the optimism of market advocates for private methods of risk
adjustment, and their belief that government cannot serve in this
role efficiently,2" the common action problems inherent in such a
venture are sufficiently daunting to make the call the other way.
Consumer-directed care theorists segment care in a way that
aligns with assigning the risk-spreading role to the government.
Most of the costs of care are "catastrophic" costs-people with
high-cost, chronic conditions consume most of the care. That care
is not optional, and shopping for expensive, high technology ser-
vices is a task better left to experts than to individual consumers.
This aspect of risk adjustment does not concern inter-sponsor
245
competition. Government can pool the risks and pay providers-
centers of excellence-for excellent, coordinated services. 246 As
Porter and Teisberg argue, "[p]roviders should be rewarded for
competing regionally and nationally to deliver the best-value care
242. See CONSUMER-DRIVEN HEALTH CARE, supra note 7, at 170-75 (discussing private
risk-adjustment systems); Newhouse, supra note 218, at 132 (discussing risk adjustment
methods in the Clinton health program).
243. See generally Joseph P. Newhouse, Risk Adjustment: Where Are We Now?, 35 INQUIRY
122 (1998).
244. See CONSUMER-DRIVEN HEALTH CARE, supra note 7, at 171.
245. This move also would eliminate a competitive problem faced by American busi-
nesses in global competition. Most foreign businesses do not directly carry the costs of
health care for their members, but rather provide, along with others in society, funding
through taxes and other assessments for care.
246. See Porter & Teisberg, supra note 74, at 72-73.
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for particular conditions or diseases." 247 Through a form of internal
markets,4 government can contract with "focused factories" or
"centers of excellence" to provide a choice of high-quality care for
the chronically ill; employers can offer HSAs or other forms of fi-
nancing for care not provided by the government's catastrophic
coverage; and employers and individuals can manage routine and
sub-catastrophic costs, as employers and individuals now manage
retirement income supplemental to Social Security. A needs-tested
supplemental program can provide for those unable to supple-
ment the catastrophic coverage.
CONCLUSION
Consumer-directed health care will play an important part in
American health finance, if for no other reason than the failure of
managed care and other reasonably available alternatives to offer
any plausible hope of expanding coverage and reducing costs.
There is substantial appeal to consumer-directed care's segmenta-
tion of health finance tasks between routine care, low-cost care,
and catastrophically expensive care.
But health finance reform makes sense only if it focuses man-
agement's attention on care for the chronically ill and reverses the
disincentives to include the chronically ill as plan members.
Choice, incentives, and autonomy have a place in health plan de-
sign. But persons with high-cost chronic illness must be the focus
of any reform movement, not an afterthought. If a system creates
incentives for providing efficient and effective care for the chroni-
cally ill, it will solve the lion's share of the problem. If it shunts this
issue to the side, and instead fiddles with incentives for well people
to economize, it will fail.
247. Id. at 72.
248. I borrow this term from the British system where the government centrally funds
and manages health care. See, e.g., Timothy StoltzfusJost et al., The British Health Care Reforms,
the American Health Care Revolution, and Purchaser/Provider Contracts, 20J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y
& L. 885, 885-86 (1995). Borrowing much more from the British system is difficult. The
British system has government control with private contracting the exception, while the
American system has private contracting with government control the exception; they "come
to contracting from fundamentally opposite directions." Id. at 886. However, the U.S. gov-
ernment has experimented in recent years with "internal markets," encouraging
competition among providers by selectively contracting on the basis of quality and price. Id.
at 897-901. The problems presented in this paper suggest that we should consider an excep-
tional role for government in the financing of catastrophic costs.
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The market, however, appears poised to adopt forms of con-
sumer-directed care as though encouraging the well to economize
on care is the tough task. Success in that task may be achievable,
but to pursue a system based on that goal is a fool's errand. Our
health economy made a mistake in adopting managed care; it
permitted entrepreneurial, simple-minded, cost-driven forms of
managed care to dominate the market, ignoring advice of man-
aged care theorists that these forms of managed care were not up
to the task. We should not repeat that mistake by adopting entre-
preneurial, simple-minded, cost-driven forms of consumer-directed
care. They will subject the chronically ill to risks of foregone treat-
ment and impoverishment, and they will not succeed in reducing
health cost inflation. Recognizing the complexities of health fi-
nance reform, we should focus on the twin tasks of encouraging
the creation of "focused factories" of care for the chronically ill,
and adopting a governmental system of catastrophic insurance to
ensure equitable funding for such care.
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